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A bstract
The importance of achieving a sustainable fiscal budget deficit has received in­
creasing attention from academics and policy-makers. A stable long-term relationship 
between government expenditures and revenues is a key requirement for macroeconomic 
stability and development. Thus, this dissertation addresses the issue of fiscal sustain­
ability from an empirical perspective. We illustrate how different methodologies can 
be applied to the analysis of fiscal sustainability, some of which are novel in context 
of this literature. We first look at the application of an Indicator of Fiscal Sustain­
ability, based on Blanchard (1990) and Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003), to a variety of 
countries. We then propose an efficient test for ’strong’ fiscal sustainability, using the 
procedures of Horvath and Watson (1995) for inference when the cointegration vector 
is pre-specified. We show tha t regime shifts are pervasive in this context and suggest a 
Markov switching cointegration approach to test and model fiscal sustainability subject 
to regime changes. Finally, we model the dynamics of Thailand’s discounted debt using 
the Markov switching framework developed by Davig (2005).
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study is aimed at understanding the dynamics of fiscal sustainability by using 
a variety of statistical and econometric techniques. There subsists a contradiction 
between the predictions of empirical models, which point to a significant degree of 
unsustainability across different countries, and the relative scarcity of episodes of full- 
scale defaults. Therefore, it is of great importance to reassess empirical methodologies 
dealing with the analysis of fiscal sustainability. Indeed, this work shows tha t once 
appropriate econometric methods are put to use, the paradoxical findings of earlier 
literature virtually disappear. The research focuses on developing countries, particularly 
Thailand. However, in order to illustrate the methodologies and its robustness, we also 
analyse countries from other regions and at different stages of development.
1.1 Background
Recently, fiscal sustainability has become a major concern in macro economics. In order 
to adopt an appropriate fiscal policy, it is im portant to have a clear understanding of 
the macroeconomic structure and the transmission mechanisms of an economy. The 
macroeconomic interactions of an economy determine how such economy responds to 
external shocks. The sustainability of the country indicates high economic credibility. 
If a government is aware of the dynamics of fiscal sustainability and how it responds 
to shocks, it will be better able to devise a suitable fiscal policy in order to maintain 
the economy’s growth and development potential. Fiscal sustainability requires the use 
of public finances to stabilize the economy during periods of external shocks without 
necessarily over-heating the economy or aggravating further macroeconomic distortions. 
The ability to sustain efficient government expenditure while prices are rising requires 
an effective coordination of fiscal and monetary policies with macroeconomic outcomes.
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Many researchers have examined how to measure fiscal sustainability. Popular 
amongst these methods are the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability approach and the In­
tertemporal Budget Constraint approach. These methods are sector specific and have 
their limitations when the underlying assumptions are altered. The need to develop 
a  robust and comprehensive measure of fiscal sustainability is an im portant research 
endeavor which this thesis intends to address, at least in part.
More specifically, we contribute to the literature in several distinct ways. First, 
we apply the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability to a range of countries, thus providing 
the scope for international comparisons. More substantially, we propose the use of an 
efficient test for sustainability, tha t can be derived as a testable implication from the 
government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint. It is based on the test procedure of 
Horvath and Watson (1995), developed for the case of testing under pre-specified coin­
tegration vectors. This framework is more efficient than both the univariate approach 
and the standard cointegration tests, as it accounts for the likely correlation between in­
novations to revenues and expenditures and it incorporates the appropriate theoretical 
restriction on the cointegration vector. As a by-product of our long run analysis, we also 
analyse the dynamics of revenues and expenditures in a Granger causality framework. 
Using appropriate testing procedures to deal with 7(1) processes in VARs in levels, 
we were able to test four types of possible interactions: revenues causing expenditures 
(‘spend-and-tax’), expenditures predicting revenues (‘tax-and-spend’), revenues and ex­
penditures being simultaneously determined (‘fiscal synchronization’) and no causality, 
implying unsustainability.
We then propose an alternative methodology to deal with potential changes in fiscal 
regimes. By employing a Markov switching specification of the long run relationship 
between revenues and expenditures, as in Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1997), we are able 
to simultaneously: 1) test for cointegration using Gabriel’s et al. (2002) procedure; 2) 
assess the type of fiscal regime (whether ‘strongly’/ ‘weakly’ sustainable or unsustain­
able) tha t a country experienced at a given period and 3) analyse the timing of the 
transition between the estimated regime types.
Finally, we investigate sustainability of the discounted debt process resorting to a
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Markov switching sustainability test, applied to the case of Thailand, this is an alter­
native framework of studying fiscal sustainability, based on the univariate properties 
of the debt process. It allows us to model discounted debt as following a two-state 
Markov switching process, in which the regimes correspond to periods of collapsing and 
expanding debt. We can expect to find long periods in which debt is repaid, corre­
sponding to debt sustainability, alternating with shorter periods of rapidly expanding 
debt (due to political or economic crisis) which will appear to be locally unsustainable. 
Nevertheless, the presence of these regimes does not imply tha t the unconditional mean 
of the process is zero and therefore th a t discounted debt is globally sustainable.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the lit­
erature on the measurement of fiscal sustainability. We explore previous research on 
the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability approach and set out the Intertemporal Budget 
Constraint, which form the theoretical framework for subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 focuses on the implementation of the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability 
to a set of countries, following Blanchard (1990) and Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003). 
The empirical results demonstrate how the indicator measures fiscal sustainability and 
its potential usefulness in signalling a crisis.
Then, in Chapter 4, we assess a variety of approaches tha t deal with the empiri­
cal implications of the Intertemporal Budget Constraints (IBC). These stem from the 
observed statistical properties of the time series involved in the study of the IBC. We 
explore the use of standard testing procedures, based on unit root and cointegration 
tests, and illustrate how an efficient test for strong sustainability can be employed.
In chapter 5, we first show how regime changes seem to be pervasive in studies of 
fiscal sustainability. We then suggest an alternative method to test and model fiscal 
sustainability subject to regime changes. This is based on a Markov switching approach 
developed by Hall et al (1997) and Gabriel, Psaradakis and Sola (2002). It allows the
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researcher to simultaneously test for sustainability and model potential policy shifts.
In chapter 6 we focus on the implementation of the additional empirical implica­
tion of the IBC, based on the behaviour of a country’s discounted debt. Thus, we test 
the stationarity of Thailand’s discounted debt by employing the procedures developed 
by Davig (2005), which allows for possible departures from sustainability of a Markov 
switching type.
Lastly, a remainder chapter summarizes the main findings and addresses some of 
the limitations of our analysis, exploring potential guidelines for future research.
2. ASSESSING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY: A SURVEY
This chapter surveys the literature on fiscal sustainability measurement. We focus 
on the three main themes covered in the present work, namely the Indicator of Fiscal 
Sustainability Approach (IFS), the implications of the Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
(IBC) and the Markov Switching Approach (MS).
2.1 The definition of Fiscal Sustainability
A  formal definition of fiscal sustainability has not yet been agreed, although researchers 
agree tha t the concept of sustainability relates to a government’s solvency or its ability 
to service debt repayment. A sound fiscal policy is at the core of the discussion and can 
be characterized as the balance between revenues and expenditures at a certain debt 
level. Burnside (2004) proposed a definition of fiscal sustainability as the government’s 
ability to indefinitely maintain the same set of policies while remaining solvent. The 
key question is: what is government solvency? In the context of government solvency, 
fiscal sustainability requires th a t government’s debt does not rise above the repayment 
threshold - such tha t the debt to CDP ratio does not hinder the government ability to 
service debt payment. Then the conclusion drawn from this point is tha t fiscal sustain­
ability is the government’s ability to service the debt, while performing the same set or 
current policies and maintain the debt ratio at a level during a certain period.
2.2 Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability
One of the various approaches which has been developed by many researchers to mea­
sure economy sustainability is the fiscal sustainability indicator. Its evolution started 
from Buiter (1985), Blanchard (1990) and has been followed by many scholars such as
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Gramlicli (1990), Chouraqiii, Hagemann and Sartor (1990), and Croce and Juan-Ramon
(2003).The advantage of the fiscal sustainability indicator approach is tha t the indica­
tor is simple and can be comprehended, evaluated and compared in different countries 
and times. Moreover, it is not difficult to adjust and update.
To begin with, Buiter (1985) presented ”a guide to public sector debt and deficits” 
in 1985. He reported four ways through which government can reduce the real value of 
their debt.
” First, at a given general price level and a given nominal price of bonds, they can 
run a budget surplus and repurchase existing debt. Secondly, they can attempt to reduce 
the real value of the outstanding stock of debt, at a given general price level, by pursuing 
or announcing policies that cause a drop in bond prices. Third, an inflationary policy 
can reduce the real value of the inherited stock of debt, even with a balanced budget and 
given nominal bond prices. Finally, a government can formally repudiate part or all of 
its deb f\^
Buiter(1985)’s sustainability indicator relies on the difference between the primary 
surplus and the surplus th a t stabilizes net government wealth. The disadvantage of 
this indicator is that the approach to the measurement of government net wealth varies 
in different countries. This will lead to differences in the actual level of net wealth.
In another study, Blanchard (1990) proposed a CAB (Cyclically Adjusted Budget 
Balance) as an indicator of fiscal policy and suggested a new set of fiscal indicators. 
The CAB study focuses on how tax incentive factors in fiscal policy affects individual 
decision and aggregate demands. It found tha t the weak points of using the CAB are: 
1.) there are many factors such as inflation or real interest rate, revenues, social insur­
ance programmes and the changing composition of the population, for example, tha t 
make the future potentially change from the present; 2.) one assumption is tha t the 
economy will return to its mid-cycle position quite fast, otherwise this assessment may 
not work well. The proposed indicators in this study are the primary gap^ and the
1 Buiter (1985, p 22).
 ^The primary surplus minus the debt to GNP ratio multiplied by the difference between the real
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medium-term tax gap.® He found tha t these indicators cannot be applied to the far 
future (as suggested by the application to Germany data)^, therefore a third indicator 
has been proposed, namely the long term  tax gap.® Gramlich (1990), Chouraqui et al. 
(1990) also examined the fiscal indicators approach. In addition, it is useful if details 
are taken into account such as the size/power of the economy or scale of economy or, 
for example, considering whether the data  th a t we need to test is from a developed 
country or developing country or HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries), the struc­
ture of government expenditure, etc.
Rudin and Smith (1994) investigate sustainability measurements for Canada from 
1937-1984 and the United States from 1890-1986. They proposed a simple sustainabil­
ity indicator, presented in terms of the present-value budget balance. The measure of 
sustainability focused on the stock of net government liabilities and primary surpluses 
over some relevant period. It was called the U statistic: if the value of U is greater 
than one and keeps continuing, this would lead the government to insolvency or unsus­
tainability and if the value of U is less than one, this case is considered as sustainable. 
The weak points of this study are the definition the government’s net debt® and tha t 
this was applied to a developed country.
One variable which is debt in particular has received considerable attention. Indeed, 
the dynamics of debt was studied by Curtis (1997), who analysed the fiscal policy in 
Canada by using the data from 1980-1996. He examined the underlying causes of the 
persistent debt problem, following the Blanchard (1990) approach by using a set of 
indicators of fiscal policy sustainability called ’’tax gaps” , setting the framework for the 
design and implementation of fiscal programs to control the debt ratio. The economy
interest rate and the growth rate.
® The average over the current and the next two years of spending and transfers as ratios to GDP
plus the ratio of debt to GDP times the interest rate minus the growth rate minus the current tax rate 
Unchanged benefit and retirement age policies would lead to an increase in the contribution rate
as a percentage of taxable of close to 20 percent.
 ^The average of the sum of government spending plus transfers, as ratio to GNP, over the next 50
years plus the debt-to-GNP ratio multiplied by the difference between the real interest rate and the
growth rate, minus the current tax rate.
® Rudin and Smith (1994) provided a detailed review of the definitions of scope of government.
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is vulnerable to adverse shifts in monetary conditions and economic growth as the debt 
ratio is high. Burnside (2003) and Burnside and Meshcheryakova (2003) studied the 
cyclical adjustment of the budget surplus and proposed some tools for fiscal sustain­
ability analysis.
Another aspect examined by Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003) was an assessment of 
fiscal sustainability using a cross-country comparison. They also focused on the debt 
ratio, following Buiter (1985) and Blanchard (1990). They proposed a recursive al­
gorithm to set the indicator of fiscal sustainability. The proposed approach which is 
derived from the motion law of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is subjected to a govern­
ment reaction function tha t links convergence to the targeted debt ratio. They used 
quarterly data of 12 developed and developing countries to analyze this approach. They 
found evidence of causality between the fiscal policy stance and growth-adjusted real 
interest rates. An interesting point of this study is the use of quarterly data, which 
enables a more detailed picture of fiscal policy problems.
2.3 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint Approach: IBC
One of the centrepieces in analysing the fiscal sustainability is the Intertemporal Budget 
Constraint (or Present Value Budget Constraint). Many other approaches are based 
on or relate to this approach. Fiscal consolidation is a vital part of fiscal sustainability; 
not only can it improve public sector efficiency, but also stimulate economic growth. 
Nevertheless, if the government is not aware of how to manage expenditure, it will be 
unable to stimulate the economy, a collapse might occur instead.
The key components of fiscal consolidation are government’s expenditure and rev­
enue. In the long run, an equilibrium relationship between expenditure and revenue is 
one of the main requirements for fiscal sustainability. Government’s expenditure and 
revenue is a sensitive area in policy-making: increases in revenue via taxes may cause 
negative effects on growth, for example. However, particularly in indebted countries, 
the government needs to run primary surplus to relieve the debt, which is one key fiscal 
policy issue. Thus, when should the government run a primary deficit or surplus? The
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present value budget constraint approach of fiscal sustainability may provide a frame­
work for answering these questions.
The IBC has been first applied to assess fiscal sustainability by Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986), by illustrating alternative measures of sustainability stance on the dynamic sta­
bility approach. It establishes th a t the government is subject to an IBC, which means 
tha t in the future, the government will run surpluses in order to compensate its prevail­
ing deficit. They proposed an empirical framework based on unit root tests, assuming 
for simplicity a constant real interest rate. They conclude that the IBC has not been 
violated in the United States, hence fiscal policy is sustainable. Kremers (1988) argues, 
however, tha t it is difficult to accept the imbalance of the debt and deficit situation in 
the United States. Kremers showed tha t a bounded debt-GDP ratio is an essential and 
sufficient condition for fiscal policy to be sustained, and the condition is tha t there is 
an upper bound on the tax rate. And the results show tha t in order to satisfy the IBC 
condition, the interest rate should grow higher than the rate of debt.
When using econometric models, the results are not always consistent; the data  is 
very sensitive, as suggested by Wilcox (1989). W hen he extended the data, the result 
changed. Wilcox (1989) followed Hamilton and Flavin’s work and argued tha t the esti­
mated process for the discounted debt series was stationary during the first half of the 
sample period (until 1974), but it is not stationary in the second sample period.
A number of academics employed different methods of analysing the data. In this 
respect, Hakkio and Rush (1991) also applied the IBC by using the concept of cointegra­
tion between government expenditure and revenue. They allow the interest rate can be 
fluctuated unlike Trehan and Walsh (1991). Moreover, they use several different sample 
periods to test for the deficits. In addition, they normalize the government spending 
and revenue by using GNP and population. Their findings show tha t if revenue is grow­
ing less than expenditure, this will cause deficits and a sustainability problem. Trehan 
and Walsh (1991)propose the tests of intertemporal budget balance in two ways. The 
first case is tha t if expected real rates are constant, the combination of the stock of debt 
and the net-of-interest deficit should be stationary which is necessary and sufficient for 
intertemporal budget balance. And the expected real rate should be positive, then
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the stationarity of the inclusive-of-interest deficit is sufficient to satisfy intertemporal 
budget balance.
Researchers and economists have explored and employed various methodologies to 
capture the behaviour of economic factors, which affect the changing of the economy. 
The IBC can be considered as the base model for public sector sustainability measure­
ment. Hence, in chapter 4, this approach will be employed for government expenditure 
and revenue data testing for fiscal sustainability.
2.4 Markov Switching Approach
This work will devote a great deal of attention to the effects of potential regime shifts 
in the relationship implied by the IBC. Indeed, it is relatively consensual to admit 
tha t a country’s fiscal policy is sometimes confronted with strains (that can arise from 
different sources; the business cycle, currency crises, etc.) which may lead to occa­
sional departures from a sustainable path. An econometric approach tha t has gained 
widespread acceptance in modelling regime changes or sudden shifts is the Markov 
switching method proposed in the seminal paper of Hamilton (1989). This method was 
initially applied to investigate the dynamics of the business cycle, in which changes are 
driven by an unobserved discrete state variable generated by a homogeneous Markov 
process, see Hamilton and Raj (2002) for a survey. Several extensions and applications 
have been proposed, both in the field of Economics and Finance, including extensions 
of the ARCH family of models to account for time-varying volatility (see Hamilton 
and Susmel, 1994). Studies tha t have focused on developing countries include Eichen- 
green. Rose, and Wyplosz(1995), for example, who study the occurrence of crises by 
identifying which features of countries explain contagion effects, caused by trade link­
ages rather than macroeconomic fundamentals similarity. Jeanne and Masson (2000) 
focus on exchange rates and estimate devaluation probabilities, while Mouratidis and 
Spagnolo (2003) extend the work of Jeane and Masson (2000), which focus on EMS 
currency crises. They show that currency crises are caused either by fundamental or 
by self-fulfilling market expectations, driven by weak external uncertainty from both 
combinations.
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Another strand of Markov switching models focus on exchange rate forecasting, 
such as Cerra and Saxena (2000) and Marsh (2000). These authors found that Markov- 
switching models provided better forecasts for exchange rates. Moreover, Bessec (2003) 
suggests a model that can explain not only past crises, but can also predict future finan­
cial crises. The investigation focuses on emerging markets especially during 1997-1998 
Asian crises. He employs a Markov-switching model to analyze the role of contagion in 
the currency crises during the 1990s, by performing a systematic comparison and eval­
uation of three distinct causes of currency crises which are contagion, weak economic 
fundamentals and sunspot (unobservable shifts in agents’ beliefs).
However, we will specifically focus on the empirical implications of the IBC, which 
describes a present-value-type of relationship between debt levels and the forcing vari­
able given by expected future budget deficits. This type of theoretical framework has 
also received attention from Markov switching practitioners. A common application 
is tha t of the stock price-dividend relationship in equilibrium asset pricing, as studied 
in Gecchetti, Lang and Mark (1990), Bonomo and Garcia (1994) and Driffill and Sola 
(1998), for example. The main idea is to allow the endowment stream in the present- 
value relationship (dividends in this case) to be subject to regime shifts of the Markov 
switching type and then model these effects in the context of the present-value model. 
These authors show th a t such a representation fits the data well and encompasses spec­
ifications tha t include non-linear intrinsic bubbles. A similar application of a Markov 
switching present-value relationship is studied in Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1997), in 
which changes in the long-run consumption-income relationship is driven by shifts in 
permanent income. This then generates significant evidence in favour of time-varying 
cointegration where the long-run variables are allowed to shift stochastically between 
two different regimes.
Another closely related paper to our work is tha t of Raybaudi, Sola and Spagnolo
(2004), in which current account deficits are allowed to follow a Markov process. Then, 
periods under which the current account accumulates at a non-stationary rate can be 
identified as periodically collapsing bubbles, employing modified unit root tests. Using 
data for 5 countries they found tha t the long run budget constraint is satisfied for Brazil,
____________________ 2. Assessing Fiscal Sustainability: a Survey____________________ 13
Japan and UK, while Argentina and US’s results are more controversial. Note how­
ever tha t their method is univariate and hence does not consider multivariate dynamics.
Thus, we suggest th a t a Markov switching present-value framework can be used 
to model potential shifts in the present-value-type relationship implied by the IBC. 
Although the approach in itself is not novel, it is the first application to the study 
of fiscal sustainability. There is, however, an alternative univariate Markov Switching 
approach suggested by Davig (2005). This author analyses the behavior of the US 
discounted debt by extending the works of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Wilcox 
(1989). Davig (2005) allows the discounted debt to follow two fiscal regimes, one in 
which is expanding in the first regime and a second regime in which it is collapsing. He 
concludes th a t the US discounted debt in the long run is sustainable even though the 
expanding regime is not sustainable. For the sake of completeness, we also explore this 
approach in Chapter 6, applying it to data  on discounted debt in Thailand.
3. AN INDICATOR OF FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY (IFS)
The previous chapter provided the details of researchers’s attem pts in assessing fis­
cal sustainability by exploring an effective approach or indicators. Three prominent 
approaches tha t we mentioned are the Indicator Fiscal Sustainability approach, the 
Inter-temporal Budget Constraint approach and the Markov Switching approach.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of the IFS approach in 
assessing fiscal sustainability and also the consistency of the indicator when applied to 
various regions. One of its advantages is its relative simplicity. The condition to assess 
fiscal sustainability is tha t the government budget constraint is satisfied. Not only debt 
repayment will be taken into consideration, but also government insolvency; therefore, 
the forward-looking approach which relates to the projection of government revenues 
and expenditures has to be compatible with the projection of GDP growth rates and 
real interest rates.
We focus our investigation on a set of 6 countries, extracting data  from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics database, using quarterly data from 1975 to 2003. 
We examine countries from 5 regions; Europe (Finland and France), Latin America 
(Bahamas), Asia (Thailand), South Africa and US. There are two main reasons for 
choosing these countries for this empirical study: first, we wish to assess the robustness 
of the procedures for a variety of countries with different economic structures, varying 
degrees of economic development and from distinct geographic regions; second, we apply 
this method to some countries for which the IFS approach has not been used.
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3.1 Data Deûnitions
In this research, the key variables, which we apply in our analysis, are all explained in 
this section. Most of variables are used in IFS approach such as Public Debt, Interest 
Rate, GDP Growth Rate and Primary Surplus, while in IBC approach we focus on 
Government Expenditure and Revenue. And Public Debt is also employed on Markov 
Switching approach. The detail of these variables are as follows:
3.1.1 Public Debt
The component of public debts is internal debt; owed by lenders within the country 
and external debt, owed by foreign lenders. Bonds and bank loans are also included in 
public debt. Every country tries to manage its debt by borrowing at the lowest possible 
cost over a medium-to long-term time frame, as it tries to avoid taking on high debt 
structures th a t can cause problems in the future. The role of public debt is vital in 
fiscal sustainability since the last decade; debt ratio is one of the indicators tha t can 
determine the country’s financial circumstance. There are various fields related to debt 
such as how to measure debt when it has been stated tha t it is a t critical level; and 
how to manage debt as the stock of debt become more complicated, particularly in 
the countries tha t have been in debt crisis or are still in excessive debt level. In this 
chapter, debt is the one of the main variables and we will investigate its behaviour and 
the affect of debt on the financial situation. In the core part of the model, we will set 
the target of debt tha t the government need to achieve the solvency level. We employ 
domestic and foreign debts as public internal and external debts, correspondingly.
3.1.2 Interest Rate
Interest rate is an essential tool to stimulate economy activity; on the other hand, care 
is needed due to the threat of inflation. I t is the key instrument of controlling inflation, 
as increase in interest rates can relieve the risk of inflation. Furthermore, the interest 
rate can effect investment, exchange rates and consumption. The interest rate, which 
plays an im portant role in this analysis, includes domestic and foreign interest rates. 
The data  tha t we utilize are market rate and treasury bill rate as domestic interest rate
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and foreign interest rate, respectively.
3.1.3 GDP Growth Rate
The GDP growth rate is one of the main variables in this analysis. Growth rate of 
GDP is potentially related to fiscal sustainability since fiscal management can improve 
the public sector by delivering public services and stimulate economic growth. The 
strong economic growth rate and the restraint of government expenditure can increase 
primary surplus, which will be one of the effective paths to reduce government debt. 
Hence, growth rate have a vital role not only in fiscal sustainability, but also in terms 
of credibility. We use Gross Domestic Pro duct (with year price based) as real GDP and 
normalize to yield the GDP growth rate.
3.1.4 Government Expenditure
Expenditure or public spending is a key component for fiscal policy. The economy can 
be boosted or it can collapse if the government conducts the wrong policy via reducing, 
increasing or transferring spending. Different types of fiscal policy will have different 
effect on the structure of expenditure. The combination of government spending such 
as health, education and defence needs to be allocated the appropriate amounts. Re­
duction in government expenditure can ultimately alleviate the country’s debt. The 
data  tha t we use for public spending is expenditure.
3.1.5 Government Revenue
W hen the government wants to increase expenditure, they may also need to raise the 
tax  level, otherwise they may need to borrow the money from financial institutions 
(domestic or foreign) in order to meet their country’s needs. However, the performance 
of the government will be effective if they can create a policy tha t can serve demands 
without increase in resources. Tax plays a key role not only in fiscal policy, but also as 
a fiscal sustainability indicator, as tax  is the main source of revenues. Revenues data
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that we employ is exclusive grants receive.
3.1.6 Primary Surplus /  Deficit
If the government wants to relief public debt, the present value of future primary bal­
ances (generally primary surplus) should exceed the current public debt. The primary 
balance comprises of government revenue and expenditure, excluding grants and debt 
repayment. Hence, Primary surplus or primaiy deficit is one of the major tools of the 
government policy. Restraint in government expenditure or increased tax should be 
considered with the other factors within the structure of government budget such as 
rate of economic growth, interest rate and inflation rate. Primary balance is the most 
crucial factor in this approach, which we will examine in depth in the analytical section. 
We use deficit or surplus as public primary surplus.
3.2 Data Sources
We employ these approaches to examine the fiscal sustainability for various regions. Our 
sample includes quarterly data from 1975 to 2003 and annual data  for some approaches 
extracted from the IMF database. The data  that we will investigate in this chapter is 
required to have two main characters, which are: i) long period and ii) from the same 
source in order to obtain the same calculation criteria of the data set. Therefore, the 
country th a t we select to test will depend on the data availability. Nevertheless, not 
only will we consider the above mention characteristic of the data, bu t also the chosen 
country will be examined from both approaches (Indicator Fiscal Sustainability and 
Inter-temporal Budget Constraint). In this chapter, some of these variables such as 
GDP growth rate, interest rate and public debt will be utilised to test in the Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator approach. The data of government expenditures, revenues and 
primary surplus will be mainly examined in chapter 4.
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3.3 An Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability Approach
We follow Blanchard (1990) and Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003). This method will aim 
to build an indicators involving major factors of sustainability such as government ex­
penditure and revenue, the interest rate, the GDP growth rate, and public debt (both 
domestic and foreign)^. Moreover, this method requires setting the assumptions and 
conditions which satisfy the intertemporal government budget constraint. As mentioned 
earlier, the debt ratio will play an im portant role in this study, as we will concentrate 
on the sustainability of the ratio of debt to GDP.
The main starting point of fiscal sustainability assessment is tha t the model must 
satisfy government budget constraint.
Government budget constraint can be expressed as
{Gt — Rt) +  iD t — Dt ~  (3.1)
P D fF  iD t — Dt — (3.2)
=  (1 4-i)D t_i -  (3.3)
Given Rt is government revenue, Gt represents government expenditure, iDt~\ is inter­
est payment on public debt. Dt and Dt~\ are public debt at time t and public debt at
time t-1 respectively. PD t is primary deficit and P St represents primary surplus. And 
(Gt — Rt) — PD t : if the government revenue is less than government expenditure, then 
the government runs a budget deficit (primary deficit), and P St = —PDt-
From the above equations, the government revenue less government spending and in­
terest payment on public debt is equal to a change in the stock of public debt (both
government domestic borrowings and foreign borrowings).
Based on previous research of Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003), we model as follow­
ing.
ZID =  GZ -  3" F %D (3.4)
 ^ The lowest debt rate will be set as a key condition in this approach
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From the above equation, the change in government debt (denoted as D) is equal to
the total budget deficit (if the government run budget deficit, G > T, therefore primary 
deficit (PD ) ~  - primary surplus (P S) plus the debt payment for the next period (debt 
in this period times interest rate or we can write as
Dt Dt~\ +  iD  — P S  (3.5)
(as primary deficit is equal to minus primary surplus:P5'f — —PD t )
In order to get the condition of government solvency, we begin with equation (3.5). 
And consider with a full economy (with foreign currency and exchange rate), from 
equation (3.5), we obtain the government budget constraint in terms of domestic cur­
rency for period t
P D t +  IP t = P f  -  Of_i) +  E t(D ^ -  Df_t) (3.6)
O f  +  E tD f  =  (1 +  i f  )O f., +  e , ( l  +  i f -  P St (3.7)
D f  and D f  represent as domestic debt in domestic currency and external debt in for­
eign currency, respectively. Et express as the average exchange rate between the end of 
period t  — 1 and t, hence D f  = E tD f. i f  and i f  are respectively the average interest 
rates on the domestic and external debt at time then the interest payment can be 
defied as IP t — +  E tifD f_^.
We divide the equation (3,7) by nominal GDP at time t : (F^), and denoting ,
domestic debt ratio: d f  ~
external debt ratio: d f  = ^  =
primary surplus: pst = ^  ' ^  =  (1 -b 7Tt)(l +  gt),
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is the change of the nominal gross domestic product in terms of the growth rate of 
the real gross domestic product (g) and the inflation rate (tt); and
et ~  — 1 is the rate in the average nominal exchange rate.
We will obtain the debt ratio equation as
+  (3 8)
Prom the equation 3.8, the government is solvent and the debt ratio is stabilized if 
n  < gt as limt^oo E{dt) = 0.
Or we can simplify as follows;
di =  (1 +  r t) ( l  +  ^ d t- i~ p s t  (3.9)
dt — (1 +  f t) ( l  H-^t) ^dt-i — {Rt — Gt){l — Tt)  ^ (3.10)
In other words, two conditions are required as follows: rt > gt for all t as we need the 
debt ratio to be stabilized; furthermore, it is necessary tha t Gt — Rt < 0 on average, 
the government needs to run a budget surplus. According to the sufficiency of these 
two conditions, running a budget surplus by either increasing tax or reduction in the 
expenditure can pay off the debt.
Then, denoting Pt = is the spread between the real interest rate with regard
to the total debt and the rate of growth of the real domestic product. We obtain:
dt = ptd t-i -  pst (3.11)
The meaning of this equation is tha t under the current policy and without shocks, debt 
ratio will rise continuously on the condition th a t the growth rate grows less than the
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real interest rate while the government run budget surplus.^
From the law of motion of the debt-to-GDP ratio, we can get debt ratio by other 
alternatives.
1 1dt — w d t^ i — -wpst (3.12)Pt Pt
IÎ dt = dt — 1 
Then dt =  ^ ,d t+ i  -
The condition for government solvency up to time N  is
1 1 1  1dt = —pst+i +  -^-—pst+2-p—^pst+N +  - ^ ■■- dt+i (3.13)
Beyond this, there are two conditions for solvency which are:
1) assuming the discount factor remains constant from time t  to time t-\- N , then as 
the government require the primary balance become positive; and
2) requiring dt+N — d* where 0 < d* < dt as we need the debt ratio to be reduced by 
the present value of expected primary surplus ratio.
Regarding specific assumptions, defining the variable and the government reaction func­
tion we will consider from equation (3.6).
dt = Ptdt~i -  pst (3.14)
From this equation, we can set the targets for the government, which are 
» Debt ratio target
d( =  Ptdt-i — pst (3.15)
• Primary surplus target
dt — Ptdt-i ~  pSt (3.16)
•  Or even set the target of discount factor
dt — P fd t-i ~  pSt (3.17)
{dt. the debt ratio; pst : primary surplus ratio)
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Following Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003), we will use the lowest value of the debt 
in the sample to be our debt target. The target that we will use can be obtained from 
setting a target equation.
ps*t =  ( r  -  1 )<  (3.18)
pSt and /?* will be converge to d*, as we need to obtain the target debt ratio (ps^ is 
primary surplus ratio, /?* is discount factor and d* is the target debt ratio.)
pst — ps* T  Xt{dt-i — d*) (3.19)
dt — {Pt — Xt){dt-i — {P* — — l)d*) (3.20)
From this equation, there are two main conditions, which are: dt-i > d* and At| <  1 
as we want dt converge to d*, then we obtain indicator fiscal sustainability as:
, ^ 5  =  ( A - A , )  =  [ [ ^ - 5 3 : 1  (3.21)
The indicator composes of two components which are P and A:
P : the spread between the real interest rate with regards to the total debt and the rate 
of growth of the real domestic product.
A : the government surplus or deficit and the difference of the previous debt and the 
target debt.
A lead indicator is P which defines the spread between the observed real interest rate 
and the observed rate of growth (at time t). If the spread rises very high, this will cause
the government indebtedness to increase. We will not consider when P is less than 1
as this will lead to inefficient capital over-accumulation (as r  <  g) in a steady state. A 
reflects the ratio between two sets, the first one is the deviation of the observed primary
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surplus ratio with respect to the prim ary ratio tha t keep the debt ratio at target level, 
and the second set is the deviation of the observed public debt ratio and the primary 
surplus ratios with respect to their target values. The value of d'k can be obtained by 
considering the lowest value of the debt ratio during the testing period^. If I F S  < 1: 
it means fiscal situation is sustainable and if I F S  > 1; this case will give a signal of 
fiscal unsustainability.
see Enzo and Juan-Ramon (2003)
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3.4 Empirical Results: Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability
3.5 European region
We observe two countries using quarterly data (France and Finland). The recognized 
crisis in Europe occurred during 1992-1993; which corresponds to the ERM (European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism) crisis. France was one of the members of the European 
Monetary System (EMS). However, Finland also faced the crisis; which will be a useful 
implication for this research. The weak fundamentals of the public sector might be one 
of the reasons of causing the crisis. Hence, we focus on the fiscal sustainability analysis. 
The tension within the ERM started to rise from July 1992, concentrating originally on 
the lira, then on sterling and finally on the other countries’ currencies; the crisis seems 
to have accelerated due to interest rate reductions from the Bundesbank.
Finland’s economy is similar to other countries in European region in tha t it mainly 
depends on manufacturing export, although it needs to import raw materials and basic 
products. The climate does not support developing agricultural products. The collapse 
followed the financial crisis of many countries. The combination of the pegged exchange 
rate, an overvalued currency coinciding with a high inflation rate resulting from the 
credit expansion and capital market deregulation in the latter half of the 1980s led 
Finland into the economic crisis in 1990s. This was a much more severe event than the 
crisis of the 1930’s. Not only had the above-mentioned factors caused the crisis, but 
also the dismantling of trade with Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been a major 
market for Finland. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the growth rate and primary surplus 
respectively, showing how the government budget dropped sharply from 1991 until 1994 
and recovered from the end of 1997 onwards. The growth rate also fell dramatically in 
1991. This circumstance corresponded to the ERM crisis, which thus forms a practical 
lesson for the analysis of fiscal sustainability.
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Fig. 3.1: Growth Rate of Finland
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Fig. 3.3: Growth Rate of France
France joined the Euro currency in February, 2002. The French economy, compared 
with the other countries in the European area, was prominent in both industry and 
agriculture. A major burden of the economy was volatility high unemployment and 
economic growth which followed the recessions in the late 1990. The problems of the 
economy included the large stock of inefficient public sector enterprises and the increase 
of budget deficit. Other major burdens of French economy were high levels of taxation 
and a rising budget deficit. However, poverty and income inequality in France remained 
relatively low.
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3.6 Asian Region
We study Thailand as the representative of the Asian region, where the Asian crisis 
was triggered from. After the crisis, Thailand recovered rather quickly by increasing 
consumption and encouraging export. The crisis started due to an increase of the 
inflows and the asset markets prices in the early 1990s, corresponding to a high growth 
period for East Asia. However, in 1997, the investors lost their confidence in securities, 
which caused major capital outflows. This problem affected neighbouring countries as 
well. The high debt tha t caused the crisis came mainly from the private sector and was 
guaranteed by the public sector. In the banking sector, the systemic of banking crises 
led to the liquidation of many commercial banks. The systemic crises was compounded 
by deteriorating capitalization of surviving bank, declining real estate valuation, and 
bearish trend in stock prices. The weaknesses of the financial sector was thus the major 
component of the crisis. Recently Thailand economy again faced difficult challenges, 
because of natural disasters (the 2005 tsunami) and the outbreak of SARS slowed 
the economy down. In general, the government policy reforms tha t follow the economic 
slow-down mitigated the further decline in output growth and worsening of the financial 
crisis.
3. An Indicator o f Fiscal Sustainability (IFS) 29
g -U S
10.00
.00
6.00
n^
 4.00
12
0.00
CO
CN CO
-4.00
Year
Fig. 3.4: Growth Rate of US
US data are mostly employed in numerous studies, given the robustness and reliability 
of the data  sets. The US economy is endowed with abundant natural resources and 
human capital. Since 1991, the US has sustained positive growth rate while maintain­
ing low unemployment and inflation rates. In terms of government spending, there are 
conclusions on the sustainability of the US government spending, while some studies 
argued tha t the US deficit is appropriate for its growth and macroeconomic sustain­
ability, others have seen the trends as detrimental to the economy.
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Fig. 3.5: Primary Surplus of US
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3.8 Latin America Region
The Latin America crisis occurred in 1994-5. The starting point emerged from the 
Mexican peso crisis.
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
a: 10,000
5.000
0.000
-5.000 f
CN
- 10.000
-15.000
Year
Fig. 3.6: Growth R ate of Bahamas
The Bahamas economy is dependent on tourism and offshore banking. Although 
the economy is market-oriented, the state still has an im portant role in the main areas, 
such as insurance, public utilities and tourism. Bahamas has no personal or corporate 
income taxes; hence the income tax structure is somewhat inelastic. The majority of 
the revenues comes from international trade or indirect tax from import, export and 
stamp duties. The figures shows th a t the Bahamas primary government budget has 
been in a deficit. This increased sharply in 1982 as the government focused on the 
tourism program. After the completion of construction projects, the growth rate rose 
dramatically in 1985. The slowdown in the US economy in 2001 has had an affect on
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Fig. 3.7: Primary Surplus of Bahamas 
Bahamas’s economy as US are its main trading partner (visitor).
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Fig. 3.8: Growth Rate of South Africa
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Fig. 3.9: Primary Surplus of South Africa
3.9 Africa Region
South Africa has one of the highest levels of income inequality, as the economy is rel­
atively well-developed in the southern part, but undeveloped in the other areas. The 
economy is mainly based on the agricultural sector. Fixed exchange rates have been 
used in South Africa until the late 1960s, changing to floating exchange rates in 1979. 
South Africa faced a high debt ratio in 1985. The figure shows that the growth rate in 
South Africa increased steadily from 1994 until 1998 and declined significantly there­
after. In the mid 1990s, South Africa faced high debt which coincided with the budget 
balance. The primary surplus figure demonstrated tha t from 1990, budget deficit in­
creased significantly, particularly in 1994. Nevertheless, from 1994 South Africa adopted 
a reforming agenda to secure its fiscal situation.
These are the overview of the countries th a t we will analyse for the fiscal sustain-
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ability. Various factors tha t we need to use in this approach will be defined in the 
following section.
3.9.1 Debt ratio
The graphs below show the debt ratio in South Africa and US which will provide a 
preamble to investigate the indicator of fiscal sustainability.
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Fig. 3.10: Debt ratio of South Africa
As we can see from the case of South Africa, debt has increased to the highest point 
in 1978:2 at 40.55%; meanwhile in US, the peak debt point is over 50% in 1993:4 at 
50.05%. On the contrary, the lowest point of debt in South Africa is 28.47% in 1981:4. 
In the United States, in 1975 the debt level is at 23.64% which is the lowest point of 
this data  set. We consider the highest and lowest levels of debt so as to scrutinize the
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Fig, 3.11: Debt ratio of US
fiscal unsustainability and set the  target of debt respectively, which is the  key point of 
th is chapter. From these two countries, the  characters of the  graph are quite the same 
in the  aspect of m agnitude.
The debt ratio from these two countries have raised and the range is nearly the  same, 
as well as the  shape of the  debt ratio. However, the  economies of these two countries 
is to ta lly  different. Hence, the  percentage of debt ratio  could be viewed from different 
perspectives. We also investigate the  countries from various regions, which are Euro­
pean, Asia, Latin American and South Africa as we dem onstrate as follows.
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Figure 3.12 are the graphs tha t we observe the debt ratio of 3 countries. The debt 
ratio of Finland starts to increase sharply in 1992, especially in 1993, until in 1998 it 
drops dramatically. France’s debt ratio has fluctuated during 1981-1984 and increased 
gradually from 1993, while Bahamas’s debt has fluctuated from 1976 and increased 
gradually to 26 % in 1989, declining significantly to 17% in 1982. However, the level 
of debt ratio increased again from 1990 and reached the highest point at 35% in 1995. 
The debt ratio in these countries are the focus factor for the empirical countries in the 
test of the fiscal sustainability.
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Fig. 3.12: Debt Ratio of Bahamas, Finland. France
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3.9.2 IFS: Indicator o f Fiscal Sustainability 
Prom the indicator of fiscal sustainability equation
1 4- n  p s t - p s * .I F S  = (pt -  Af) =  [1 -\- Qt d t-\ — d*' (3.22)
the result shows tha t A will respond to various variables which are primary surplus, 
debt ratios, tax, exchange rate, expenditure deviation and shocks.
R e su lt 1
These figures 3.13-3.18 demonstrate the indicators of both countries of South Africa and 
US, in South Africa, the result shows that the fiscal stance is entirely unsustainable, 
especially in 1982:2, the indicator became very high at 11.37. For the United States, it 
is clear that from 1976 to 1981, it is unsustainable.
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Fig. 3.13: IFS of South Africa
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Fig. 3.14: IFS of US
If the government changes its policy or the interest rate, what is the effect on the 
indicator? We examine what happens after increasing and decreasing the value of P^. 
The results from the both countries are as shown in figures 3.15 - 3.16;
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Fig. 3.15: IFS 1 of South Africa and US
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Fig. 3.16: IFS 2 of South Africa and US
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Result 2
I F S l  and I F  32  are the increasing and decreasing the value of (3^  respectively.
For South Africa, if we increase the value of from 1.10 to 1.15, the average value 
of ps* th a t expect to converge to the target debt ratio, will be from 2.936 to 4.2 of GDP 
given d* as 28 percent. On the other hand, if we decrease the value j3  ^ of from 1.10 to 
1.05, the change of ps* value will be 1.4. In this respect, it also demonstrates tha t the 
model is quite consistent as when we deviate the value of as the IFS will change 
significantly as well. Our results show this trend vividly, for example in the case of the 
United State, when we raise up and minimize the value of from l.IO to 1.15 and 
1.02, given d* as 23 percent, the average values of ps* that expect to converge to the 
target debt ratio, will be from 21.276 to 2.3 and 0.46 of GDP respectively.
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Fig. 3.17: IFS of Bahamas
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Fig. 3.18: IFS of Finland
From the figures 3.17 -3.20, the figures demonstrate the other countries IFS from 
various regions We find that fiscal policy is mostly unsustainable in the testing coun­
tries; however, in France, fiscal policy seems to be sustainable from the year 2002-1, 
and also from 2002-2 in Thailand the fiscal policy also is sustainable after they faced 
serious crisis in the year of 1996-1997. The obvious fiscal unsustainability country is 
Bahamas as the results show tha t the IFS are not only highly fluctuating, but also 
extremely high either in increasing or decreasing dimensions.
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3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we employed Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003)’s approach to a represen­
tative sample of countries. The approach emphasizes on setting the target of debt. 
We use this approach with various regions in order to explore the consistency of the 
approach. We found tha t IFS presents positive results; it provides an explanation of 
the fiscal policy, even though the government requires to adjust the performance. One 
of the advantages of this indicator is th a t it is not difficult to obtain. The main dis­
advantage is that, in other regions apart from Europe when we employ the lowest 
values in the sample as the target debt (d*)(following Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003)), 
the procedure causes countries to show unsustainability, particularly if episodes of un- 
sustainability are recent.
We have seen some of the advantages of using an Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability, 
which bypass the need to test for stationarity of the series, for example. In the following 
chapters, however, we will focus on the tests th a t explicitly take into consideration the 
statistical properties of the data. We will base our analysis on the theoretical framework 
provided by the Intertemporal Budget Constraint Approach, which considers the joint 
behaviour of government expenditures and revenues.
 ^ For European countries, the target debt is set at 60 following the Stability Pact, see Croce and 
Juan-Ramon (2003).
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3.11 Appendix
The government solvency equation calculation can be simplified by starting from the 
equation 3.7
D f  +  E tD f =  (1 +
d f  +  d f  =  ( 1  +  i f  +  ( 1  +  - p s t
We divide the first equation by nominal G D P  a t time t  % ) , and denoting
are the change of the nominal gross domestic product in terms of the growth rate 
of the real gross domestic product {g) and the inflation rate (tt); and the rate in the 
average nominal exchange rate respectively,
Oi +  kl+7r,)(l+gd ^  *
We denote that: r f  =  — 1
_  (l+ ^ f)(l+ et) _  t (l+TTt)
And n =  î-f ^  + rf ^
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or 1 +  n  =  (1 +  r f  +  (1 +  r f
Hence, we obtain:
We divide by we get:
(1+gt) Wt_iJ i-1 (1+gd
Then simplifying, we obtain,
4  =
The next step, denoting Pt — fi+g^ is the spread between the real interest rate with 
regard to the total debt and the rate of growth of the real domestic product. We obtain:
Hence,
dt = Ptdt-i -  pst
d t-i = j^d t-i -  j^pst
The condition for government solvency up to time N , we can rewrite as:
1 1  1 1  dt — -^pst+i +  ~p— P^t+2 +  "'jg—~pst+i +  -^~~^dt+i (3.23)
as government solvency equation.
4. AN EFFICIENT TEST FOR FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically assess the sustainability of the fiscal 
regimes in six developed and developing economies, resorting to a variety of time series 
econometric techniques applied within the context of the intertemporal budget con­
straint (IBC) framework. We focus on the Bahamas, Finland, France, Thailand, South 
Africa and US. The purpose of choosing these countries is to provide an overview of 
fiscal sustainability over a range of economies with different degrees of development.
Following Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and as in the previous chapter, the IBC can 
be expressed as
Dt — '^ n ^ _ i ( l  +  it+k) ^{Pt+n — Gt+n) +  lim IIfc=i(l 4- it+k) ^Dt+n (4.1)^  ^ n—^oo71=0
where Dt : government debt in the present period
Rt- Government Revenues
Gti Government primary expenditures
we know that the present value of government debt Dt is the combination of the ex­
pected present value of the future primary surpluses ^k= iil~^‘^ t+k)~^{Rt-i-n — Gt+n) 
and limn_*oo 11^ =1 (1 -f-Zi+/c)“ ^A+n> the expected present value of the government’s debt. 
If we assume tha t lenders rule out the possibility of a Ponzi game^, this implies tha t the 
asymptotic term converges to 0 and we thus have a ‘transversality condition’ ensuring 
sustainability.
 ^ That is, the government is not allowed to indefinitely pay its current interest payments merely by 
borrowing more. Otherwise, the rate of growth of debt could be equal to the (mean) real interest rate.
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However, the above expression is not convenient for empirical work. Following the 
convention in the literature, one can rewrite (4.1) as
O O
Et — Rt = ^  ~  ^C t+ j)  +  /S.Dt+j (4.2)
n=0
by noting th a t Dt can be expressed as D* =  (1 +  r)D t-\ P  Gt — Rt and applying the 
difference operator to (4.1). Et is now government expenditures inclusive of interest 
payments with discount factor ô =  ( l +  r ) “ .^ Given tha t the variables Et and Rt usually 
appear to display non-stationary behaviour, this provides a statistical framework for 
testing sustainability. Indeed, deficit sustainability implies that revenues and expendi­
tures must be cointegrated with cointegration vector [1, —1], if each are 7(1) processes. 
In practice, this amounts to estimate the generic regression equation
Rt =  a +  bEt +  Ut (4.3)
and testing whether or not 6 = 1 .
However, as pointed out by Quintos (1995), this not a necessary but a sufficient 
condition for a stringent interpretation of fiscal sustainability. In fact, a necessary con­
dition imposes tha t debt should grow slower than the borrowing rate. Thus, following 
the typology of Quintos (1995) and M artin (2000), we may have four possible scenarios 
for sustainability:
• ‘Strong’ sustainability, if and only if the 7(1) processes Rt and Et are cointegrated 
and 6 =  1: this means tha t the IBC holds and simultaneously the undiscounted 
debt Dt is also 7(1)).
• ‘Weak’ sustainability in the case where Rt and Et are cointegrated but 0 < 6 <  1: 
this is corresponding to the case of a smaller than 1 long-run elasticity of revenue 
relative to expenditure and therefore may be an incentive for debt default.
• Unsustainability, when 6 < 0, implying tha t deficits are being accumulated at 
a rate greater than the growth rate in the economy and the IBC is therefore 
violated^.
 ^The case 6 >  1 implies indefinitely growing surpluses and therefore is not consistent with fiscal 
sustainability per se.
4. An Efficient Test for Fiscal Sustainability 52
Thus, the usual procedure in the literature is to apply conventional unit root tests 
to Dt (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986, Trehan and Walsh, 1988 and 1991, for example) 
or cointegration tests such as the two-step Engle-Granger procedure applied to (4.3) 
(Haug, 1991, Hakkio and Rush, 1991, Ahmed and Rogers, 1995). We depart from, and 
thus contribute to, the literature by using efficient tests of the ‘strong’ sustainability 
hypothesis. Indeed, we employ the cointegration test developed by Horvath and Watson 
(1995) for the case when the cointegration vector is pre-specified, as is the case with 
‘strong’ sustainability, with cointegration vector [1 ,-1].
The common practice in empirical applications is to proceed in two stages: first, 
test/estim ate cointegration assuming the cointegration vector is unknown and, if coin­
tegration is found, as a second step proceed with estimation with cointegration main­
tained both under the null and the alternative, with a ‘restricted’ cointegration vector 
arising from the first step. However, as pointed out by Horvath and Watson (1995), in 
this situation the usual tests are inefficient in small samples. These authors derived a 
testing procedure for the case when the cointegration vector is known, which allows for 
substantial gains in power when compared to standard procedures th a t do not impose 
a cointegration vector. Its computation is also reasonably easy, as it is based on a Wald 
test of the error correction term in a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).
In the bivariate case, the ‘strong‘ sustainability case implies tha t a direct test can be 
obtained by testing the stationarity of Dt itself. However, Horvath and Watson (1995) 
also show tha t a multivariate cointegration approach can lead to efficiency gains over 
the univariate unit root tests if the error terms of Et and Rt are correlated, as it is likely 
to be the case, as shocks affecting the expenditure and the revenue sides are likely to 
be highly correlated.
Therefore, there seems to be a compelling case for the use of this procedure. The 
caveat of this test is, naturally, th a t its relative power will suffer if the variables are 
cointegrated with a cointegrating vector different form the pre-specified one, namely 
the case of ‘weak’ sustainability. We argue, however, that given the implications of 
the latter, the ‘strong’ hypothesis should be the benchmark case when assessing fiscal 
sustainability.
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A  separate issue th a t we consider is to ascertain the causal direction between ex­
penditures and revenues. This may help in identifying which element, if any, of the 
budget constraint can lead to control over the other and thus assist policy-making by 
identifying the source of potential government fiscal imbalances. For tha t purpose, we 
employ modified causality tests developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) that allow 
for the presence of non-stationary variables in an estimated VAR.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section analyses the fiscal regimes 
of 6 countries using conventional unit root and cointegration methodologies. We then 
describe the testing procedure of Horvath and Watson (1995) and contrast the previous 
results with those obtained with the efficient tests of Horvath and Watson (1995). Sec­
tion 4.3 presents the results for causality tests and a discussion concludes this chapter.
4.1 Empirical analysis
4.1.1 Univariate tests o f Rscal sustainability
As discussed above, one can adopt two strategies to test for fiscal sustainability. One 
is to note tha t ‘strong’ sustainability implies a cointegration vector of [1 ,-1], which 
means tha t the long run equilibrium relationship between expenditures and revenues 
can be tested based on a univariate test for the primary sur plus/deficit PSt = Gt~ Rt- 
Testing whether or not this series is stationary allow us to draw conclusions on sus­
tainability of the ‘strong’ type. An alternative, and perhaps more flexible, approach is 
to estimate a standard cointegration regression like (4.3) and test whether 6 =  1 or, 
instead, 0 < 6 < l.In  this section, we follow the first route.
Figure 4.1 displays the series of primary surplus for the six countries under consid­
eration. Visual inspection suggests tha t the series do not exhibit a trending pattern, 
rather fluctuating around a mean, although with periods of substantial deviation from 
this ‘mean’ behaviour. To formally assess the properties of this series, one should resort 
to unit root tests.
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In Table 4.1 we present results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and 
the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock unit root tests, both on the levels and in first-differences 
of the P St series (with a constant term  included) computed using the software EViews 
(lag lengths and bandwidths automatically selected based on the Schwarz Information 
Criterion).
According to these results, we find tha t the series for primary surplus in the Bahamas 
and France display a clear stationary and, hence, sustainable behaviour. The picture 
is less clear for the USA, given tha t the Phillips-Perron test does not reject the null 
of a unit root. On the other hand, Finland, South Africa and Thailand appear to be 
on an unsustainable path, given tha t all tests fail to reject the null of non-stationarity. 
However, as argued above, there may be efficiency gains in resorting to a multivariate 
testing framework, using the joint dynamics of expenditures and revenues. We next 
explore cointegration tests involving these two variables, after assessing their individual 
statistical properties.
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Level Primary Surplus
Countries ADF PP ERS
Bahamas -4.8722* -4.982* 2.725
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Finland -1.806 -2.925 12.928
(0.696) (0.156)
France -7.812* -8.320* 1.710
(0.000) (0.000)
South Africa -1.594 -2.402 14.522
(0.789) (0.376)
Thailand -1.713 -3.355*** 15.594
(0.739) (0.063)
US -2.957 -1.501 0.083
(0.149) (0.824)
First Difference Primary Surplus
Countries ADF PP ERS
Bahamas -10.608* -15.013* 0.226*
(0.000) (0.000)
Finland -11.242* -16.210* 0.259*
(0.000) (0.000)
France -9.251* -74.647* 0.946*
(0.000) (0.0001)
South Africa -5.514* -10.104* 2.489**
(0.000) (0.000)
Thailand -12.044* -16.147* 0.267*
(0.000) (0.000)
US -2.502*** -15.505* 6.654
(0.118) (0.000)
* : Test at 1% significance level
** : Test at 5% significance level
*** : Test at 10% significance level
Tab. 4.1: Unit Root Tests of Primary Surplus
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4.1.2 Unit Root and Standard Cointegration Tests
As mentioned earlier, the series of government expenditures and revenues appear to be 
non-stationary, as shown in Figure 4.2
This is largely confirmed by unit root tests on each series. Again, we employ the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock unit root 
tests, both on the levels and in first-differences of the variables, the results being pre­
sented in Table 4.2 .Given tha t the variables display a clear trending pattern, a de­
terministic trend is also included. The unit root tests reveal, as expected, tha t the 
series can be classified as being J ( l) . Indeed, the tests on the levels are not rejected, 
while the results for the first-differenced series indicate stationarity. This is true for all 
testing procedures. This means tha t cointegration is the appropriate framework to as­
sess the sustainability of these fiscal regimes. Thus, we now estimate the cointegration 
regression (4.3) and test whether 6 — l o r O < 6 < l .  We employ a residual-based ap­
proach to testing cointegration, i.e., we first estimate (4.3) and then ascertain whether 
the estimated equilibrium errors are stationary or not. There is no efficiency losses 
in pursuing a single-equation route when compared to the multi-equation method of 
Johansen (1988), as we are studying a bivariate relationship with potentially a single 
cointegration vector. Thus, we consider the standard OLS estimator of &, as well as 
the dynamic OLS (DDLS) estimator of Stock and Watson (1991), which augments the 
cointegrating regression with p  lags and leads of the differenced explanatory variable, 
in order to correct for second-order biases usually associated with the simple OLS es­
timator (see Maddala and Kim, 1998 for a survey). Hence, we also estimate b via the 
regression
p
Rt = a + bEt -f ^  ^ lS.Et—j ■Ut, 
j=-p
determining p by testing down the significance of the extra leads and lags, starting from 
p =  4.
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Level Expenditures Revenues
Countries ADF PP ERS ADF PP ERS
Bahamas -2.97 -10.517* 7.971 -2.564 -8.237* 10.387
(0.145) (0.000) (0.298) (0.000)
Finland -4.358* -3.885* 3.172* -3.110 -3.984** 4.846**
(0.0037) (0.0157) (0.109) (0.0178)
France -2.408 -2.408 8.794 -2.081 -3.141 9.920
(0.374) (0.374) (0.551) (0.102)
South Africa -9.907* -9.925* 6.679*** -2.902 -4.249** 7.365
(0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.0052)
Thailand -2.246 -3.044 11.720 -2.671 -1.993 2.577
(0.459) (0.125) (0.251) (0.598)
US -0.740 -5.573* 24.214 -2.508 -3.296*** 6.256
(0.967) (0.001) (0.324) (0.0721)
First Difference Expenditures Revenues
Countries ADF PP ERS ADF PP ERS
Bahamas -13.331** -41.237* 0.435* -14.829* -28.852* 0.275*
(0.000) (0,0001) (0.000) (00001)
Finland -8.025** -25.142* 0.061* -8.864* -25.917* 0.122*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
France -12’524* -12.667* 1.060* -15.562* -18.174* 0.419*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
South Africa -9.888* -41.389* 14.419 -15.502* -16.478* 1.623*
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000)
Thailand -16.018* -17.090* 0.840* -2.435 -11.084* 10.506
(0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.000)
US -13.031* -22.625* 0.297* -3.948* -18.020* 7.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0024) (0.000)
* : Test at 1% significance level
** : Test at 5% significance level
*** : Test at 10% significance level
Tab. 4.2: Unit Root Tests of Expenditures and Revenues
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Countries AEG PO boLS AEG ols POoLS boOLS
Bahamas -3.4598* -12.5750* 0.8998 -3.3245 -9.3950* 0.9724
(0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0421) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0363)
Finland -2.0147* -3.5536* 0.8128 -1.6097 -2.8657 0.8240
(0.0425) (0.0005) (0.0404) (0.1010) (0.0045) (0.0457)
Prance -7.6712* -8.2290* 0.8128 -4.3531* -6.9563* 1.0132
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0666) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0585)
South Africa -3.6702* -7.0494* 0.9299 -2.8360 -3.7609* 0.9746
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0002) (0.0311)
Thailand -1.7252* -3.3786* 1.0049 -1.6708 -2.5199 1.0084
(0.0801) (0.0009) (0.0339) (0.0895) (0.0120) (0.0326)
US -2.6490* -2.7363* 0.9690 -2.4990 -2.1955 0.9775
(0.0084) (0.0065) (0.0257) (0.0127) (0.0277) (0.0258)
* means rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration
Tab. 4.3: Augmented-Engle- Granger (AEG) and Phillips-Ouliaris(PO) cointegration Tests
We observe from Table 4.3 that, in general, the OLS estimates tend to further away 
from 1 tha t the corresponding DOLS estimates. Considering the estimates alone, this 
would imply th a t the Bahamas, Finland and France would be classified as ‘weakly’ sus­
tainable, with the remaining countries to be considered ‘strongly’ sustainable. If one 
looks at the DOLS results, however, all countries display estimates very close to the 
‘strong’ sustainability benchmark, with the exception of Finland, with b — 0.824.
Note tha t this analysis is conditional on the existence of cointegration between ex­
penditures and revenues. Looking a t the residual-based tests, with OLS residuals one 
would be lead to conclude tha t, according to the AEG test, Thailand, Finland and the 
USA would fail to meet the sustainability criteria, given tha t the statistic fails to reject 
the null of no cointegration. Interestingly, however, the Phillips-Ouliaris test indicates 
tha t only the US would not be sustainable.
If we consider instead tests based on the DOLS estimator, the AEG would point 
to unsustainability for all countries with the exception of France. The Phillips-Ouliaris
4. An Efficient Test for Fiscal Sustainability 61
test, on the other hand, would add South Africa and the Bahamas to the latter. There­
fore, a contradiction seems to emerge: by employing a theoretically more appealing 
estimator, it appears tha t the case for sustainability is weakened, although the point 
estimates suggest tha t the cointegration is indeed [1 ,-1]. Next, we employ the efficient 
test of Horvath and Watson (1995) to try  to disentangle this issue.
4.2 Testing for cointegration when the cointegration vector is specified
The setup for the derivation of the test is similar to the reduced rank procedure based 
on a Gaussian VAR
^  =  dt~f  X t
p
X t ~  +  6t
i = l
where and X t are n x l  variables, dt is a deterministic term (possibly including time 
trends) and £t is normally distributed with covariance matrix Eg. As usual, we can 
rewrite the above system in vector error-correcting form as
p — i
X X t  = H%t_i +  ^  ] ^ iA X t—i +  £t (4.4)
1=1
where H =  —In +  Yii=i
As in Johansen (1988), a test for r  =  ranA;(n) can be developed for the hypotheses
Ho : rank{U) =  r  =  To
Ha ■ rank{U) =  r  =  To +  r^, > 0.
We follow the notation of Horvath and Watson (1995), so tha t the alternative hypoth­
esis contains Ta, the number of additional cointegrating vectors th a t are present under 
the alternative. We can partition the ranks according to the number of (un)known 
cointegration vectors, tha t is, +  Vo^  and Tq =  +  T'a,., with the subscripts k
and u indicating ‘known’ and ‘unknown’, respectively.
____________________4. Ail Efficient Test for Fiscal SustaJnahiJity____________________ ^
In order to derive the test statistic, we need to factor the matrix II as IT =  6a', 
so tha t 6 and a  are n  x r  matrices of full column rank and the columns of a  give the 
cointegration vectors. As above, these matrices can be partitioned into a  =  (ctoQa) and 
6 — {6o6a) and, to reflect the knowledge of the cointegration vector, aa — and
6a = {6akdau)  ^ 80 tha t the rai^  columns of aa^ are the additional known cointegration 
vectors under the alternative Ha- This implies th a t II% t-i =  +  6a(cKL-^t-i)-
In our case, given tha t we have a bivariate relationship, we will be testing Ho v Ha 
in the case where To =  0 (i.e., no cointegration) and =  1, since we have a single,
pre-specified cointegration vector given by [1, —1]. Thus, the model can be rewritten as 
(ignoring dt for notational convenience)
AYt — 4- PYt +  Et,
where =  ($i$2...$p_i) and =  (AF;(_iAy;L2...A};Lp+i). Let Y =
AY =  y -  Y_i, Y =  [Yi...Yt1, c =  [ei.-Er] and M z = [I -  Z{Z'Z)-'^Z']. The Wald 
statistic for Ho against Ha is
W =  [uec(AWM,yLia,J]'[(c;,^r (g) E;^][uec(AWM,Y.ia,J] (4.5)
where is the OLS (MLE), given the Gaussianity assumption) estimator of E 
(Eg =  T~^ê'ê) and {AY'MfY-io:ak)iciakXfi^zY~iCiak)~^ is the OLS (MLE) estima­
tor of 6ak-
The authors show tha t the above statistic has a complicated asymptotic distribution 
tha t depends on Wiener processes. Critical values were obtained by simulation and 
tabulated by the authors. In our empirical application, we allow for a constant term in 
the VECM, to reflect the fact th a t the variables contain trends. Thus, critical values 
for our case can be found when n  — =  2, — ra„ =  0, =  1 and for Case 2,
with critical values 13.73. 10.18 and 8.30, for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively (see Table 1 of Horvath and Watson, 1995, pp. 996-998)..
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4.2.1 Empirical results
In this section, we test the rank of matrix H in (4.4) using the Wald statistic (4.5) 
described in earlier section. In the case at hand, the null hypothesis if Wo : r  =  0, that 
is, no cointegration, against Wi ; r  =  1, with cointegration vector [1,-1]- This entails 
estimating the VAR in vector-error correction form. We establish the number of lags 
to be included by considering the AIC and SIC methods.
Countries Bahamas Finland France South Africa Thailand US
Wald test 30.4159** 5.5532 29.181** 14.270** 14.602** 46.194**
** : statistically significant at 1% level
Tab. 4.4: Wald Tests
Table 4.4 presents the results of the test. I t is interesting to notice tha t the null hy­
pothesis of no cointegration is rejected quite comfortably, at the 1% significance level, 
for all countries, with the exception of Finland. Thus, apart form this country, the 
results suggest tha t all countries pursue a strongly sustainable fiscal policy. This con­
clusion is line with what one could realistic expect, although the result for Finland, a 
developed economy, is a t first sight, surprising. We argue tha t this may have to do with 
the substantial distortions th a t temporary, although persistent, deviations from a sus­
tainable path may have on statistical tests based on a linear specification. Thus, in the 
next chapter, we explore a more flexible approach th a t explicitly models the possibility 
of deviations from a ‘strongly’ sustainable regime. However, for completeness, the next 
section considers causality tests among government expenditures and revenues.
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4.3 Testing for causality
Having established in the previous section, through the use of efficient sustainability 
tests, tha t there is evidence a long run equilibrium relationship, another interesting 
question is whether one can ascertain which side of the budget equation leads the dy­
namics of the fiscal regimes. Governments may decide to spend and then tax in order 
to restore the balance (‘spend and tax ’ hypothesis), in which case we would expect 
changes in revenues to be predicted by past variations in expenditures (Barro, 1979). 
Conversely, governments may prefer to raise funds to finance future expenditures or cut 
taxes to limit spending (‘tax and spend’ hypothesis) and thus one expects that growth 
in revenues predicts changes in expenditure (Friedman, 1978). Alternatively, expendi­
tures and revenues may vary simultaneously, reflecting the fact that fiscal authorities 
plan both sides of the budget equation, according to the classical view of public fi­
nance (Musgrave, 1966), which we refer to as the ‘fiscal synchronization’ hypothesis.. 
Finally, if revenues and expenditures are planned separately, reflecting institutional 
arrangements that effectively separate allocation and taxation, then neither variable 
can predict the either (Hoover and Sheffrin, 1992) and this would be consistent with 
no cointegration and, hence, unsustainability.
Thus, understanding the joint dynamics of revenues and expenditures may provide 
clues on how governments might respond to fiscal imbalances, given tha t tests of the 
above hypotheses provide estimates of the reactions to past imbalances. The statistical 
framework tha t is appropriate in this case is that of Granger-causality testing. However, 
the series involved are non-stationary. We know from the works of Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) and Yamada and Toda (1998) tha t causality testing in the presence of unit roots 
may lead to correct inferences if the standard procedures are applied. Therefore, we 
rely on the modified causality test of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to carry out our tests. 
This implies determining the order p of the VAR, where the order of the VAR may be 
selected with a usual lag selection procedure. Then, a p +  order VAR should be 
estimated, where d^ax is the maximum order of integration of the variables. The usual 
tests can then be applied, that is, this procedure essentially corrects for the degrees of 
freedom by adding d,nax- In our case, we have established tha t d^ax =  1-
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' R t ' a i + '  P h PI2 ' ‘ R t - i  ' T . . .  T
_  Y ,
.
R t —{p+i) +
.  Rt- { p+ i )  _ -  ^24
Consider a (p +  l)-order bivariate VAR involving revenues and expenditures:
P l f  P S '
where €t =  (an, £24) is assumed to  be i.i.d. with covariance matrix Eg. A test of the 
hypothesis tha t revenues do not Granger causes expenditures is equivalent to testing 
Hq : PI2 — ... =  P12 — 0, where the p 4- 1 matrix is left unrestricted, acting as a long 
run correction mechanism. Note th a t this implies long-run causal inference, as the 
variables appear in levels. Similarly, expenditures will cause revenues if the hypothesis 
Wo : P21 — ••• =  P21 — 0 is rejected. This can be tested with a classical test statistic for 
the joint nullity of these coefficients.
The results of the above tests are presented in Table 4.5, test at statistically signif­
icant a t 5% level. The order of the VARs was selected using the SIC procedure.
Countries Null hypothesis Statistic Conclusion Type of hypothesis
Bahamas E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
7.9702
7.2131
do not reject 
do not reject
No causation 
(U nsustainability )
Finland E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
0.6114
1.3989
do not reject 
do not reject
No causation 
(Unsustainability)
France E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
12.4602
7.5496
reject the null 
do not reject
Spend and tax
South Africa E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
10.7801
10.1476
reject the null 
do not reject
Spend and tax
Thailand E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
12.3110
36.2308
reject the null 
reject the null
Synchonization
US E does not cause R 
R does not cause E
19.7284
39.9453
reject the null 
do not reject
Spend and tax
Tab. 4.5: Granger Causality Tests
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We can observe tha t for the Bahamas and Finland, the statistic fails to reject the 
null of no causation in both directions. This seems to be consistent with the results 
obtained in previous sections for the case of Finland, since several tests point to a 
sustainability problem and lack of cointegration between revenues and expenditures. 
However, the result is surprising for the Bahamas.
On the other hand, the null hypothesis tha t revenues do not Granger-cause expen­
ditures is rejected for France. This implies th a t these countries’ governments pursue a 
‘spend-and-tax’ fiscal policy or, in other words, tha t these countries fiscal authorities 
are able to raise revenues required to finance planned expenditures and, ultimately, are 
able to maintain their budgets under control. As for Thailand, the test rejects the null 
of no causality in both directions. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests tha t variations 
in expenditures occur at the same time as changes in revenues, i.e., this supports the 
hypothesis of fiscal synchronization for these countries
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the empirical implications of a government’s Intertemporal Bud­
get Constraint. We have seen that, in the presence of non-stationary variables, fiscal 
sustainability implies tha t government expenditures and revenues must be cointegrated. 
It is possible to distinguish distinct forms of sustainability, namely ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
sustainability, depending on the long run coefficient of the cointegration vector. In 
order to empirically assess fiscal sustainability, one can: i) resort to univariate tests on 
the statistical properties of the series of primary surplus, which implies a test of the 
‘strong’ sustainable case, or ii) a multivariate test of the joint long run relationship 
between expenditures and revenues.
We propose a multivariate efficient test of the ‘strong’ hypothesis based on the 
test procedure of Horvath and Watson (1995), developed for the case of testing un­
der pre-specified cointegration vectors. This framework is more efficient than both the 
univariate approach and the standard cointegiation tests, as it accounts for the likely 
correlation between innovations to revenues and expenditures and it incorporates the 
appropriate theoretical restriction on the cointegration vector.
We show that the results of the conventional methodologies tend to penalize the 
sustainability hypothesis, even when the estimated b is close to 1. Indeed, in many 
instances unsustainability was found for 3 countries. This could be explained by the 
fact that the inefficiency of conventional tests may lead to loss of power of unit root and 
cointegration tests. This implies tha t the null hypothesis of cointegration is rejected less 
often than it should. When the Horvath-Watson(1995) test is employed, the empirical 
support for the ‘strong’ sustainability hypothesis is quite convincing, with the null of 
no cointegration being rejected at the 1% significance level for all countries, with the 
exception of Finland,
Furthermore, we analysed the dynamics of revenues and expenditures in a causal­
ity framework. Using appropriate testing procedures to deal with 1(1) processes in 
VARs in levels, we were able to test four types of possible interactions: revenues caus­
ing expenditures (‘tax-and-spend’), expenditures predicting revenues (‘spend-and-tax’).
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revenues and expenditures being simultaneously determined (‘fiscal synchronization’) 
and no causality, implying unsustainability.
In this chapter, the results of causality show tha t Bahamas and Finland have fiscal 
unsustainability which is coincide with the results of Bahamas from chapter 3. While 
the results from cointegration test indicate only Finland tha t fiscal policy is unsustain­
able.
Thus, we have shown how employing a diversity of time series tests can help to bet­
ter characterize the dynamics of fiscal policy and the interactions between the variables 
of interest. Nevertheless, there are some issues th a t point to interesting directions for 
further study. The case of Finland is paradigmatic, as it seems odd tha t a rich and 
developed country, with no history of debt default, is signalled to be unsustainable. 
A possible explanation for this is tha t periods of persistent and considerable deviation 
from a sustainable regime, though limited in time, change the correlation structure of 
the series and hence affect conventional tests, which are based on a linear structure. 
Therefore, in the next chapters, we explore a methodology tha t allow us to model de­
partures from a sustainable regime and thus offers the appropriate statistical framework 
to deal with potential regime shifts and non-linearities.
5. ASSESSING FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY SUBJECT TO REGIME
CHANGES
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we looked at efficient tests for the ‘strong’ sustainability hy­
pothesis in a  collection of six developed and developing countries. We observed that 
given the statistical properties of the variables involved, cointegration is the appropriate 
framework to conduct the analysis, as we are interested in the possible existence of long 
run equilibrium relationships among government expenditures and revenues. However, 
researchers have been concerned with the effects tha t structural changes may have on 
the analysis of econometric models. Indeed, failure to detect and account for parameter 
shifts is a serious form of misspecification, therefore affecting inference and leading to 
poor forecasting performances (see Clements and Hendry, 1999, for example). This is 
especially relevant for cointegration analysis, since it normally involves long time spans 
of data, which, consequently, are likely to display structural breaks.
In the context of the analysis of fiscal sustainability, the possibility of breaks af­
fecting the results of empirical tests has been recognized early on, namely by Wilcox 
(1989) and Hakkio and Rush (1991). These authors split their sample (of US data) at 
exogenously chosen break dates, but this may be problematic, as subsequent tests may 
have their power affected if the chosen date does not correspond to the true one. The 
situation when there is no a 'priori information requires a particular type of analysis, 
so the adopted solution has been to endogeneize the break point selection in the testing 
problem, maintaining the inference valid. Thus, Haug (1995), using the tests proposed 
by Hansen (1992), and Quintos (1995), allowing for changes in the cointegration rank, 
use procedures to endogenously select the break point in the sample (arriving at differ­
ent conclusions regarding the existence of structural breaks, however).
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In this chapter, we pursue a different route. We initially test whether or not the long 
run relationships studied in the previous chapter have been subject to structural breaks. 
We do so by employing the tests proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996) and extend­
ing them to the case of a cointegrating relationship without constant term^. Based 
on the results from these procedures, we then apply the method proposed by Gabriel, 
Psaradakis and Sola (2002) to investigate cointegration subject to possible changes in 
regime. This is based on the assumption that cointegration regimes are governed by 
an unobserved Markov chain process. Testing for cointegration may be carried out by 
means of standard residual-based tests, using the standardized residuals obtained from 
Markov switching estimation.
This approach offers a number of advantages. First, one can resort to the usual 
asymptotic critical values for residual-based tests, as the finite-sample distributions of 
the standardized residuals appear to be well approximated by the usual asymptotic dis­
tributions. Secondly, the above mentioned works either consider a single, deterministic 
break or assume tha t the break points are known when cointegration is being tested. 
A Markov switching approach is instead more flexible, as it allows for an unspecified 
number of breaks, of unknown location. Moreover, information on the timing of the 
breaks is a natural by-product of estimation. Thirdly, one can also assume changes in 
the variance of the long run relationship. Furthermore, testing for cointegration arises 
naturally from the estimation step, since only standard cointegration testing proce­
dures are used. Specifying long run relationships in this way encompasses a number of 
empirically plausible and economically relevant models, including the case of a single 
permanent regime change, as discussed below.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the application of 
the cointegration tests of Gregory and Hansen (1996). Then, we use the Markov switch­
ing approach outlined above to test for fiscal sustainability. A final section concludes.
 ^ I thank my supervisor for additonal help with this issue.
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5.2 Testing for fiscal sustainability allowing for regime shifts
5.2.1 Gregory-Hansen Tests
Gregory and Hansen (1996), building upon Zivot and Andrews (1992), generalized the 
standard cointegration tests by considering an alternative hypothesis in which the coin­
tegration vector may suffer a regime shift a t an unknown timing. They analyzed models 
tha t accommodate under the alternative hypothesis of cointegration the possibility of 
changes in parameters, namely a level shift model (C),
Rt — Ir g 2 D t P ' f i t  A- t  =  l , . . . ,T , (5.1)
a model with a level shift plus trend (C /T ),
Rt — g2Df. +  crt +  P'Rt +  , (5.2)
a “regime shift” model (C /S )  where both the constant and slope parameters change,
-Rt — Ml T  +  P[Rt T  P'2-RtDt +  iity (5.3)
as well as a regime shift model where a trend shift is added (C /S /T )
Rt — ff'i M2 Ht 4- a it  a2tDt 4- Ut. (5.4)
The vector (i?t, Et) is assumed to be of 1(1) variables of dimension A:, Ut should be 
a stationary disturbance and Dt is a dummy variable of the type
Here, r  E J  denotes the unknown relative timing of the break point and [.] de­
notes the integer part operator. The trimming region defined by J  may be any com­
pact set of (0,1),but following earlier literature, Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose 
J  =  (0.15,0.85).
As with the previous tests, these are residual-based cointegration tests tha t evaluate 
if the error term is 7(1) under the null of no cointegration. In this framework, however, 
since the change point or its occurrence are unknown, the testing procedures involve
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computing the usual statistics for all possible break points r  e  J  and then selecting the 
smallest value obtained, since it will potentially present greater evidence against the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration. Therefore, one should observe the values of
GAJ-Zc, =  inf (5.6)reJGH-Zt = in£Zt, (5.7)
t€J
GH-ADF = inf ADF. (5.8)
t G J
Nevertheless, as pointed out by the authors, these tests possess power against other 
alternatives, namely “stable” cointegration. Hence, a rejection of the null hypothesis 
does not necessarily imply changes in the cointegration vector, since an invariant re­
lationship might be the cause of the rejection. Also, note tha t the smallest value of 
the statistic, if leads to a rejection, can provide an idea of where a shift might have 
occurred^.
These test statistics have non-standard limiting distributions with no closed form
and, therefore, critical values were obtained by resorting to simulation methods. In this
chapter, we examine types of structural brealcs th a t were not previously tabulated by 
Gregory and Hansen (1996), which are the change in slope with stable intercept,
Rt — P ' (I'lEtP2EtDt  +  Ut, (S)
as well as a model with change in slope and no constant term,
Rt = P'l Et + Pij^EtDt + Ut- (Snc)
This is of interest for the empirical analysis of fiscal sustainability, as there can be
cases where fiscal regimes shift between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability, as in (S).
Furthermore, we also consider the theory-consistent case of no intercept, as the IBC 
implicitly assumes zero-deficits. The justification for the use of an intercept term in 
empirical studies is mainly computational, as it ensures that residuals have zero-mean.
 ^This procedure should not, however, be understood as a formal way of estimating breakpoints, as 
its properties are not well known.
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For proper comparison, and following Gregory and Hansen (1996, p. 110), we ob­
tained critical values for these types of shifts, with a single regressor, using the same re­
sponse surface: with 10 000 replications for sample dimensions T  — 50,100,150,200,250 
and 300, critical values at the p  percent level are obtained and then the regression
C{p, T ) =ipo + +  error,
is run. The critical values at the 5% significance level for the (S) model are —4.685 [GH- 
AD F  and GH-Zt tests) and —39.172 [GH-Zq, test). For the [Snf] model, the critical 
values are —4.192 for the GH-ADF and GH-Zt tests, and —30.322 for the GH-Zo, test, 
respectively. The critical values for (5.3), to be used below, are —4.95 and —47.04.
5.2.2 Empirical Results
We apply the tests discussed above to the cointegrating equation between expenditures 
and revenues for the six countries analysed before. We focus our attention on tests of 
variants (5.3), [S) and (5nc), as these are the most relevant for our application. There 
is no theoretical reason to expect the cointegrating relationship to have a deterministic 
trend and the parameter of interest in our case is p. The results Gregory-Hansen tests 
are shown in Table 5.1.
Overall, we find that the null of no cointegration is rejected by the majority of tests, 
for the three model variants and across the six countries. We notice tha t the GH-ADF 
test rejects the null less often, while the Z-type tests almost always reject the null. The 
variant [Snc) is not rejected for Thailand, while in the case of Finland, only the GH-Z^ 
is able to reject. Otherwise, for every country, model variants (5.3) and (S) have their 
nulls rejected by at least two test statistics. The general conclusion seems to point to 
the existence of a long-run equilibrium between government expenditures and revenues, 
but one tha t appears to have been subject to regime shifts.
In the table, we also report the dates corresponding to the smallest value attained 
by each statistic. As mentioned above, we can use this as an informal way of dating 
potential regime shifts. It is interesting to note tha t for several statistics, the minimum 
appears around the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, with the first quarter of 1998 the most 
often identified date. These results seem to be consistent with the stylized fact observed
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Bahamas Finland France South Africa Thailand US
-3.95 -2.93 -9.26* -4.40* -2.16 -3.96
[98 : 1] [99 : 2] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [97 : 2] [95 : 1]
C/S Za -148.15* -30.24 -100.37* -73.96* -25.22 -98.89*
[92 : 3] [99 : 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [97 : 1] [95 ; 2]
Zt -13.462* -4.48* -9.30* -7.67* -3.79 -8.91*
[93 : 1] [99 : 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [97 : 1] [95 : 2]
GHadf -3.99 -3.71 -9.04* -4.27 -3.80 -4.08
[98 : 1] [99 : 2] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [95 : 3] [95 : 1]
s Zq. -133.77* -46.60* -97.48* -67.27* -54.62* -102.42*
[92 : 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [96 : 2] [95 : 2]
Zt -12.32* -5.67* -9.07* -7.31* -6.16* -9.33*
[92 : 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [96 : 1] [94 : 4]
GTfa# -4.01 -3.56 -9.42* -4.40 -4.60 -4.78*
[98 : 1] [96 : 2] [98 : 1] [99 : 1] [97 : 2] [96 : Ij
Smc z« -133.86* -46.94* -102.34* -66.42* -50.51* -129.69*
[90 : 4] [96 ; 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [96 : 2] [97 : 2]
Z( -12.32* -5.67* -9.46* -7.26* -5.85* -12.01*
[93 : 1] [96 : 3] [98 : 1] [98 : 1] [96 : 1] [97 : 2]
* means rejection of the mill hypothesis o f no cointegration 
Break date in square brackets
Tab. 5.1: Gregory-Hansen Tests
in many countries, which have experienced fiscal difficulties following the Asian turm oil 
This seems to be the case for France, Finland, South Africa and Thailand. In the case 
of the Bahamas, breaks are also informally identified in the early 90s, while for the US, 
1995 appears to signal a shift in the fiscal regime. This coincides with the start of the 
surplus years of the Clinton Administration.
Thus, it seems appropriate to  try  to model fiscal sustainability as potentially being 
subject to shifts. However, the tests of this section assume tha t shifts occur in a de-
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terministic fashion, which is not very realistic. Also, the timing of the shifts may not 
be accurate, as the above procedures will signal the largest break in the series. For 
the sample period considered, it is likely tha t more than one break as occurred, as it 
contain years of fiscal difficulties, which at same point appear to have been resolved. 
Thus, the Gregory-Hansen tests, while being very informative in terms of inference, 
do not offer a convenient framework to model long run relationships subject to regime 
changes. A possible way of allowing for stochastic shifts is to use a Markov switching 
approach, as explained in the next section.
5.3 Fiscal sustainability under Markov Switching regime changes
Markov switching models have been extensively (and successfully) used to characterize 
and account for regime changes th a t typically occur in economic and financial time 
series, such as GDP, stock prices, interest rates, inflation rates, or exchange rates, for 
example (see Kim and Nelson, 1999 for a  survey). Given their flexibility, it would be nat­
ural to extend their use to model changes in long run relationships. Hall, Psaradalds 
and Sola (1997) and Krolzig (1997), for example, illustrate the usefulness of such a 
specification by analysing the Japanese consumption function and co-movements in in­
ternational business cycles, respectively. The Markov switching cointegration approach 
is also related, from a methodological point of view, with the work of Hansen (2000), as 
this author generalizes Johansen’s cointegrated VAR model by allowing for structural 
breaks.
Here, we attem pt to use a more general type of cointegration, where the cointegrat­
ing vector is allowed to  undergo occasional changes, which may be the result of sudden 
changes in policy, economic conditions, technology or institutions. In order to describe 
the long run relationship between revenue and expenditures, we will use the following 
model
Rt — (q(i J- Œ2St) +  {Pi +  P2St)Et +  (wi -f lU2St)Ut (5.9)
where St is the discrete-valued latent random variable indicating the regime operative 
a t time t  and Ut is a stationary and ergodic random disturbance with mean 0 and 
unit variance. The variable St is assumed to follow a homogeneous first-order Markov
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chain with state space {1,2} and transition probabilities p = Pr(sf — 2|s^_i =  2), 
q — Pr(st — l|5t_i =  1). Accordingly, the cointegrating vector will have two regimes 
defined by St, {(a i, Pi), (a 2 , P2 )}, while =  {wi, wg}, so tha t we allow the variance 
of the long run relationship to change stochastically as well, thus capturing potential 
low and high volatility regimes. Note th a t this is a generalization of the (5.3) model of 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) discussed above, in tha t we allow the shifts to be stochas­
tic as opposed to deterministic. In addition, they can occur more than once and the 
variance is allowed to change. In fact, the Gregory-Hansen model corresponds to the 
case where one of the regimes is ‘absorbing’, that is, the staying probability of one of 
the regimes is 1.
One can test for cointegration simply by resorting to the standard residual-based 
procedures, but using instead the standardized residuals obtained from the estimation 
of the Markov switching cointegrating model. These residuals are computed as
et = {R t -  [(«I +  PiEt) Pr(5i =  1|A) +  (0:2 +  A  Ft) P r(st =  2|A)]}/u(, (5.10)
where Pr(st =  i|A), i =  1,2, are the filter probabilities from the Markov switching es­
timation and at is the residuals conditional standard deviation. If more than one shift 
has occurred, the usual residuals will reflect this by appearing to be non-stationary 
and thus cointegration may not be detected. By allowing for an unspecified number of 
regime changes in the estimation step, the standardized residuals will be free of unusual 
observations due to breaks, and therefore will replicate the stationary behaviour of the 
true errors.
We start by analysing the (non)stationarity of the standardized residuals. Figures 5.2- 
5.7 plot the standardized residuals computed as in (5.10), contrasted with the residuals 
obtained from a simple linear regression. We can see that the former appear to be a lot 
more stable and, hence, stationary. This is confirmed by residual-based cointegration 
tests tha t are essentially the extension of unit root tests to a cointegration frame­
work. We focus on ADF-type and Phillips-Perron-type tests, which are also known 
as Augmented-Engle-Granger (AEG) and Phillips-Ouliaris (PC) cointegration tests. 
Gabriel et al. (2002) show that the asymptotic distributions of these tests provide 
a good approximation when standardized Markov switching residuals are used. The
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critical values obtained by McKinnon (1991) for these tests are —3.9001, —3.3377 and 
—3.0462 for 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Table 5.2 reports the results of the AEG and PO tests for each country. As before, 
the lag length for the AEG test was automatically selected based on the SIC proce­
dure, while the bandwidth for the Phillips-Ouliaris test is also data-dependent, based 
on a B artlett kernel (results do not change if other intermediate procedures are used 
instead). We can see that the null hypothesis of cointegration is always comfortably 
rejected at the 1% significance level for all countries. Comparing with the results of
Countries AEG PO
Bahamas -4.6080* -12.5545*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Finland -8.5927* -8.8795*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
France -7.9221* -8.2274*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
South Africa -4.7155* -8.4453*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Thailand -4.7087* -4.9004*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
US -8.5927* -8.4630*
(0.0000) (0.0000)
* means rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
Tab. 5.2: AEG and PO : standard residual-based cointegration Tests
the previous chapter, we have seen tha t standard residual-based cointegration tests, 
in particular the AEG test, point to unsustainability in the case of Finland, Thailand 
and the USA. This conclusion is now overturned by the Markov switching-based tests. 
Indeed, it seems tha t when we account for regime changes, fiscal sustainability receives
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stronger empirical support. Inspecting the OLS residuals obtained in the previous 
chapter, we can observe tha t these three countries experienced periods of persistent, 
but temporally circumscribed, deviation from their average time series path (deficits 
in the case of the first two countries, surpluses in the case of the latter). Given that 
a linear approach will not model these deviations, the OLS residuals will appear to 
be non-stationary. The Markov switching approach discussed here allow us more flexi­
bility in incorporating the regime changes and thus reflecting them in the inference step.
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Another advantage of this framework is tha t one can interpret changes in the coin­
tegration vector as shifts in fiscal regimes. Table 5.3 displays the estimates arising from 
estimation of (5.9). We also compute in the last two columns the difference between the 
AIC and BIG for the Markov switching and the simple linear model, so tha t a negative 
number favours the non-linear specification, which is the case for all countries. Also, 
the estimated regimes appear to be quite persistent, with estimated probabilities well 
above 0.9. We also note that, with the exception of Thailand and South Africa, the 
variance appears to be the same across regimes.
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Fig. 5.2: Bahamas standardized residuals
Taking each country in turn, we observe th a t for the Bahamas regime 1 corresponds 
to a period of ‘strong’ sustainability, as the estimate of /? is not significantly different 
from 1. However, in state 2, the fiscal regime appears to be unsustainable, as (3 becomes 
close (statistically speaking) to 1. Looking at Figure 5.1, which displays the filtered 
probabilities of regime 1, we can see tha t periods of instability have occurred in 1984-86 
(with a glitch in 1981) and in 1988-1995, after which sustainability seems to have been 
resumed. The economy of the Bahamas is capital intensive, in which state ownership 
plays a significant role in the economy and it depends mainly on Tourism. Hence, from 
1981 onwards, the large increase in the fiscal deficit can be attributed to governmen-
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tal policies to boost the economy, namely by promoting the construction hotels and a 
casino project.
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Fig. 5.3: France standardized residuals
The same pattern is present in the case of France, in which P drops considerably from
0.9664 to  a value statistically close to, or below, 0. The period of fiscal unsustainability 
coincides with the ‘Eurosclerotic’, low growth and high unemployment years of the 90s, 
which lead to increased pressure on government spending.
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In the case of Finland, again regime 1 corresponds to ‘strong’ sustainability (with 
/? =  1.0365), while regime 2 sees a shift to a ‘weakly’ sustainable regime, since the /? 
becomes lower, but different (and positive) from 1. The filtered probabilities in Figure
5.1 identify the shift to regime 2 around 1991, which then lasts until 1998. This cor­
responds to a recessionary period following the collapse and dismantling of trade with 
the Soviet Union, accompanied by an increase in interest rates in Europe, which drove 
the currency up (under a pegged exchange rate) and later on to a banking crisis. The 
economy started to recover from the recession in late 1993 as the government focused 
on capital-intensive export industries and the deficits started to  gradually decline after
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the government initiated a fiscal consolidation programme in 1995.
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A similar pattern of switches between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability is apparent 
for South Africa. For Thailand, the increase in volatility of the fiscal regime since 1988 
(see previous chapter) drives the procedure to identify transitions which seem to coincide 
with switches in the variance rather than in the strength of fiscal sustainability. This 
seems to suggest that a better way to model the dynamics of Thailand’s fiscal regime 
would be to specify the variance as following a distinct Markov chain. One could then 
separate the effects of changes in the ‘mean’ from changes in volatility.
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The same effect seems to be present in the case of the US, although to a lesser 
extent. Both countries seem to be well within the ‘weak’ sustainability case, but the fil­
tered probabilities correctly identify for the US case the troublesome periods of the 70s 
and early 90s already identified in the literature (Hakkio and Rush, 1991 and Quintos, 
1995), corresponding to a tighter monetary policy and the Reagan administration tax 
cut policy. This was followed by a period of smaller deficits in the late 80s and then the 
accumulation of surpluses during the late Clinton years. Again, a clearer picture would 
probably emerge if one considers a model with two Markov chains. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the present work, which aims at illustrating the usefulness of this
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Markov switching approach.
5.4 Conclusion
There is ample evidence in the literature th a t policy changes or sudden shifts in eco­
nomic conditions may have a substantial impact on the dynamics of fiscal deficits. In 
statistical terms, if these changes are left unaccounted for, then a policy that is sus­
tainable overall might appear to be unsustainable. Indeed, if one uses conventional 
residual-based procedures, structural breaks induce an increase in the residuals auto­
correlation which may induce an near-unit root type of behaviour.
By employing cointegration tests specifically designed to take potential regime shifts 
into account, we have shown that structural breaks seems to be pervasive in tests of 
fiscal sustainability. However, given th a t economies may experience periods of lim­
ited duration of fiscal stress, modelling this by only estimating breakpoints as in Haug 
(1995) and Quintos (1995) seems to carry little information other than potential timings 
of changes. Therefore, we propose an alternative methodology to deal with potential 
changes in fiscal regimes. By employing a Markov switching specification of the long 
run relationship between revenues and expenditures, as in Hall et al (1997), we are 
able to simultaneously: 1) test for cointegration using Gabriel’s et al (2002) procedure; 
2) assess the type of fiscal regime (whether ‘strongly’/ ‘weakly’ sustainable or unsustain­
able) tha t a country experienced at a given period and 3) analyse the timing of the 
transition between the estimated regime types.
An alternative to the results presented here would be model the primary sur­
plus/deficit series as a  Markov switching process. In principle, similar conclusions would 
emerge in the case of economies th a t switch between sustainability and unsustainabil­
ity. However, it should be noticed th a t this approach imposes the cointegrating vector 
[1 ,-1] throughout and therefore does not allow to distinguish the cases where switches 
occur between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability, as the formulation proposed here does.
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The results in this chapter is illustrated different from the results in chapter 4 in 
that in this chapter, Markov switching indicates the unsustainable periods clearly in 
each regime. ’Strong’ or ’Wealc’ sustainability provides the evidence of each country’s 
unsustainable period.
We notice, however, tha t there is scope for further refinements. As mentioned be­
fore, further insight may be gained if one allows the variance of the long run relationship 
to follow an independent Markov chain. This means that the model can be rewritten 
as a four-state Markov switching model (see Hall et a l 1997 for an example) and then 
test the hypothesis of whether changes in the variance and in the mean follow the same 
unobserved latent process.
Having established the usefulness of modelling potential shifts via a Markov switch­
ing approach, in the next chapter we turn our attention to modelling the dynamics of 
discounted debt for the case of Thailand. Again, we stress the point that, although 
countries may experience occasional periods of fiscal imbalance, tests for fiscal sustain­
ability should take into account the ‘global’ dynamic properties of the variables. Thus, 
we illustrate these issues by looking at the case of Thailand, now from a perspective of 
the univariate dynamics of the discounted debt series.
6. DISCOUNTED DEBT USING A MARKOV SWITCHING
APPROACH
In chapter 3, we have employed the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability approach to as­
sess the sustainability of fiscal policy. Then, in chapter 4 we focused on the equilibrium 
dynamics of government revenues and expenditures as expressed by the Intertemporal 
budget constraint.
In this chapter, we focus on the time series path of debt, investigating the sustain­
ability of discounted debt. Indeed, as pointed out by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), a 
simple present-value condition on government debt does not lead to full debt repayment 
if the rate of increase in the level of debt is smaller than the rate at which the debt 
is discounted. The constraint will be satisfied if the interest component of the deficit 
remains constant or decreasing, which will mean that the discounted value of future 
debt will converge to zero.
In order to study the sustainability of discounted debt, we need to bear in mind 
tha t fiscal policy is often subject to abrupt changes, motivated by political or economic 
reasons. This may lead to periods of sustained rise in the value of discounted debt. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, this may have im portant implications for 
the statistical analysis of debt dynamics. Indeed, the presence of short-lived periods of 
expanding debt will alter the persistence (by increasing it) of the time series, thus re­
sulting in apparent global unsustainability. Therefore, it is crucial to take this episodes 
into account and focus on the unconditional expected value of the process. We follow 
Davig (2005) in resorting to a Markov swiching sustainability test, applied to Thai­
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land’s discounted debt.
This framework allows us to model discounted debt as following a two-state Markov 
switching process, in which the regimes correspond to periods of collapsing and expand­
ing debt. We expect to find long periods in which debt is repaid, corresponding to debt 
sustainability, alternating with shorter periods of rapidly expanding debt (due to polit­
ical or economic crisis) which will appear to be locally unsustainable. Nevertheless, the 
presence of these regimes does not imply th a t the unconditional mean of the process is 
zero and therefore tha t discounted debt is globally sustainable.
We apply this method to Thailand. This is an interesting exercise because the 1997 
Asian crisis seems to have originated from Thailand. Hence, the first section will pro­
vide a review of Thailand’s economy and public debt’s structure. We then show how 
to construct a series for discounted debt for Thailand, as in Wilcox (1989). This is 
followed by the empirical analysis based on the Markov Switching framework and a 
concluding section .
6.1 The Economy of Thailand
Thailand^ has historically been a ” tiger” economy, with high rates of annual growth 
from the late 1970’s to 1996, with periodic slowdowns mirroring the world and regional 
economies. After having enjoyed a real compound annual growth rate of 9.6 percent 
between 1986 and 1996, Thailand suffered a sharp economic downturn with the combi­
nation of currency and financial crises in 1997, as a result of the unsuccessful defence 
of the currency and a weak banking system. After the 1997-8 currency crisis, Thailand 
became impoverished once again, and it was not until 2001 that the haht and the econ­
omy regained momentum.
 ^ In what follows, we draw extensively from reports of the Bank of Thailand and Library of Congress- 
Federal Research Division
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The contraction was sharper than anticipated, with a decline in real GDP of 0.4 and 
0.8 percent in 1997 and 1998 respectively. A number of external and domestic factors 
contributed to this outlook. Reduced export values below previous estimates delayed 
the recovery in private capital flows. Also, both domestic consumption and invest­
ment demand were weaker than expected. Thailand faced four major macroeconomic 
problems:
1. Net international reserves were depleted, because of the unsuccessful defence of 
the Thai baht
2. There were systemic problems in the financial sector.
3. The real sector faced a serious liquidity shortage.
4. Regional economic turmoil was a significant constraint in the country’s ability to 
resolve its economic difficulties.
Therefore, the government has taken a systematic, but flexible, approach in ad­
dressing these problems and strictly adhered to the economic program agreed with the 
International Monetary Fund. To date, Thailand has made steady progress in resolving 
the above problems. The Thai government has adopted an expansionary fiscal policy 
for the fiscal year 1998/1999 to stimulate domestic demand and employment and to 
finance economic and financial restructuring. The overall public sector deficit for fiscal 
year 1998/1999 was increased to 5 percent of GDP, compared to about 3 percent of 
the previous fiscal year. Note tha t these deficit targets do not include the fiscal cost of 
financial restructuring. In order to achieve the numerical targets, the government has 
implemented various revenue and expenditure measures including tax refunds due to 
exporters and corporations, temporary postponement of both the payment of corporate 
income tax and the remittance of state enterprises’ profits, and removing tax disincen­
tives to corporate debt restructuring.
Furthermore, the government resorted to foreign financing, at a level of about 1% 
of GDP, to support specific spending projects directed towards a social safety net and
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related labor-intensive investment projects. The government also continued to accel­
erate the payment of budgetary and no budgetary expenditures. The exchange rate 
has reached 37.00/USD (GDP dollars 7.3 trillions baht) as of October 26, 2006, for a 
nominal GDP at market rates of approximately US dollars 200 billions However, due 
to rapid appreciation in 2007, nominal GDP hovers around dollars 230 billions, slightly 
smaller than that of the Guangdong province in China. This keeps Thailand as the 
2nd largest economy in Southeast Asia, after Indonesia, a position it has held for many 
years. Despite this, Thailand ranks midway in the wealth spread in Southeast Asia as 
its 4th richest nation per capita, after Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia. It is also an 
anchor economy for the neighbouring least developed countries of Laos, Burma, and 
Cambodia.
Thailand is a lower middle income developing nation, heavily export-dependent. Its 
major industries are tourism, textiles and garments, agricultural processing, beverages, 
tobacco, cement, light manufacturing such as jewelry and electric appliances, comput­
ers and parts, integrated circuits, furniture, plastics, automobiles and automotive parts; 
it is the world’s second-largest tungsten producer and third-largest tin producer and 
the major agricultural products are rice, cassava (tapioca), rubber, corn, sugarcane, 
coconuts, soybeans.
Thailand’s recovery from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis relied on exports, largely 
on external demand. Thailand has a strong automotive export industry along with 
electronic goods manufacturing which has helped to strengthen the baht Agriculture 
has always provided traditional income generation, but has declined in relative terms 
in recent years, as overall exports increased. Tourism has been on the rise as well, but 
not without negative consequences. W ith the instability surrounding the recent coup, 
however, the GDP growth of Thailand has decreased from a peak under the previous 
administration, as locals as well as foreign companies hold investment back due to the 
political uncertainty. Foreign investor sentiment was further tempered by a 30% reserve 
requirement on capital inflows instituted in December 2006, and discussion of amending 
Thailand’s rules governing foreign-owned businesses.
6. Discounted Debt Using A  Markov Switching Approach______________ 94
The Thaksin government took office in February 2001 with the intention of stimu­
lating domestic demand and reducing Thailand’s reliance on foreign trade and invest­
ment. Since then, the Thaksin administration embraced a dual track economic policy 
tha t combines domestic stimulus with Thailand’s traditional promotion of open mar­
kets and foreign investment. Weak export demand held 2001 GDP growth to 1.9%. 
In 2002/03/04, however, domestic stimulus and export revival fuelled a better perfor­
mance, with real GDP growth at 5.3%, 7.1% and 6.3% respectively. However, in 2005, 
under rising oil prices and inflation, severe droughts and floods, the Southern Thailand 
Insurgency reaching a high, uncertainty of the future of Thaksin’s government and the 
tourism aftershocks of the Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami on December 26th 2004, 
economic growth slumped to 4.5%. In 2006 the economy sped up slightly under strong 
export growth; however the military coup d ’etat on September 19th 2006 caused eco­
nomic growth to stagnate into 2007 once again. Economic growth in 2007 was due 
almost entirely to robust export performance - despite the pressure of an appreciating 
currency. Exports have performed at record levels, rising nearly 17% in 2006 and 12% 
in 2007. Export-oriented manufacturing - in particular automobile production - and 
farm output are driving these gains.
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6.2 The Public Debt o f Thailand
Rattakiil(2002) provides a recent review on this issue. Public debt in Thailand is com­
posed of three parts: government debt, non financial public enterprise debt(NFPE) and 
Financial Institutions Development Fund debt (FIDF). Domestic and external borrow­
ings are the components of the Government debt, the borrowings used to finance govern­
ment expenditure and the financial restructuring cost (Tier 1, Tier 2 and FIDF I and II). 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 bonds are bonds issued by the government to recapitalise distressed 
financial institutions, by receiving preferred stocks and subordinated debentures. The 
N FPE debt comprises government-guaranteed and non-government-guaranteed debt. 
The FIDF debt included with FIDF II and non-government-guaranteed liabilities. Ta­
ble 6.1 shows the structure of public debt between 1996 and 2003 (July) by the public 
Debt Management Office (PDMO), Bank of Thailand. Before the crisis in 1996, the 
government debt was 4.3 % of GDP. However, in 2003 government debt declined from 
1,690 in 2002 to 1,622 billions corresponding to 27.52% of GDP. The recovery of the 
exchange rate made the debt in term of US dollars decrease to 8.86 million of US dol­
lars.
Year 1996 1997 2000 2002 2003
1. Government debt 176 238 1114 1690 1622
% of GDP 4.3 5.0 22.8 31.3 27.52
2. NFPE debt 432 538 909 901 860
% of GDP 10.5 11.3 18.6 17.6 16.7
3. FIDF debt 176 893 781 340 420
% of GDP 4.3 18.7 15.9 6.3 7.2
4. Public debt (1+2+3) 608 1669 2804 2931 2901
% of GDP 14.8 35.0 57.3 54.3 49.4
Domestic : External 36:64 67:33 69:31 72:28 74:26
In billions of Baht
Tab. 6.1: Structure of Public Debt
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Likewise, the N FPE debt increased from 10.5% of GDP in 1996 to 16.8% of GDP in 
2002. In 2003, it slightly decreased to 14.7% of GDP. In 1996, there was no FIDF debt 
yet. It was set up in 1997 which was highest at 18.7% of GDP. After 1997, it declined 
substantially to 6.3% of GDP in 2002. Nevertheless, it inclined a bit to 7.2% of GDP 
in 2003. This is due to the recovery of financial sector.
Public debt increased from 14.8% of GDP in 1996 to 57.3% of GDP in 2000, after­
ward declined to 49.4% of GDP in 2003. The debt comprises of Domestic and External 
borrowings. The distinctive aspect was the ratio between domestic and external; in 
1996 domestic borrowings became lower than external; after 1997, domestic borrowings 
became higher than external borrowings and the ratio domestic/external debt contin­
ued increasing in the year to 2003.
The following graph depicts Thailand’s public debt, indicating the information of Gov­
ernment Debt, State enterprise Debt, FIDF Debt and Public Debt : GDP between 1985 
and 2002 (December).
Before the crisis in 1997, the fiscal position of Thailand was a surplus, and the percent­
age of public debt to GDP was as low as 14% in 1996. In 1997, due to the crisis, the 
government absorbed substantial financial sector losses, by incurring in an expansion­
ary fiscal policy. This led to a large increase in public debt to a peak a t 58% of GDP 
in 2000/01. Subsequently, it gradually decreased to 49% at the end of July in 2003, 
while the government cash deficit became better than planned in 2001/02, due to the 
economic recovery and fiscal consolidation.
At the present level of public debt, the fiscal position remains stronger than planned. 
The government has improved fiscal flexibility by improving the efficiency of both rev­
enues and expenditures. The government has increased revenue by raising tax  collec­
tions and expanding the tax base. In 2001/02, the tax elasticity to GDP stood at
2.2 compared with 1.5 in 2000/01, reflecting substantially more efficient tax collec­
tion. The corporatisation of state-owned enterprises will further enhance efficiency and 
bring higher returns to the government. On the expenditure side, the government has 
improved the efficiency of allocation and effectiveness of spending, by implementing
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Fig. 6.1: The Public Debt of Thailand
______________6. Discounted Debt Using A Markov Switching Approach______________ ^
the zero-based budgeting. The Bank of Thailand assessed the public debt sustainabil­
ity from 2002/03 (From October 2002 to September 2003) onwards, incorporating the 
FIDF debt resolution. The general conclusions indicate tha t Thai public debt remains 
sustainable even under relatively unfavourable circumstances. Nevertheless, there are 
some other factors tha t could affect the debt towards a more or less sustainable level. 
The government has set as targets to maintain a debt ratio of less than 60% GDP, 
accomplish budget balance within five years, and drive the debt service ratio to lower 
than 16%.
Nevertheless, as discussed previously, in order to asses fiscal sustainability, one 
should also consider the evolution of discounted debt. The next section discusses this 
issue.
6,3 Discounted Debt
As discussed in previous chapters, in a dynamically efficient economy government debt 
is subject to a present-value borrowing constraint, in which the current market value of 
the debt should equal the discounted sum of expected future surpluses. Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) analyse whether or not US government debt is subject to this present- 
value borrowing constraint by employing unit root tests, finding tha t the constraint 
is satisfied. Wilcox (1989) extended their work by allowing for stochastic real interest 
rates, unlike Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) assumption of a fixed interest rate. This 
author also accounts for structural breaks in the process, by splitting the sample in dif­
ferent periods and thus reverting Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) results. Subsequently, 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) relax the assumption that expenditures and revenues are 
difference-stationary, but maintain a constant expected real rate of the interest. They 
test for cointegration based on the behaviour of the interest-inclusive deficit. They then 
assess under which conditions cointegration holds when interest rates are allowed to be 
stochastic. They demonstrate tha t if the expected real rate of interest is more than 
zero, and the inclusive-of-interest deficit is stationary, then the intertemporal budget 
balance is held.
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More recently, Davig (2005) tests the present-value constraint using a  Markov Switching 
approach, using an updated data series on US discounted debt. This method has several 
advantages, as it separates local unsustainability from global sustainability of the debt 
process. Thus, if periods of expanding debt do not last for long, the debt process will 
remain sustainable, tha t is, the unconditional mean of the Markov-switching stochastic 
process underlying discounted debt is zero. The next section discusses definitions and 
the construction of a discounted debt series.
6.3.1 Discounted Debt data, for Thailand
As discussed in previous chapters, in a dynamically efficient economy government debt 
is subject to a present-value borrowing constraint (also designated as an intertemporal 
budget constraint as in the previous chapters), in which the current market value of 
the debt should equal the discounted sum of expected future surpluses. Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) analyse whether or not US government debt is subject to this present- 
value borrowing constraint by employing unit root tests, finding th a t the constraint 
is satisfied. Wilcox (1989) extended their work by allowing for stochastic real interest 
rates, unlike Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) assumption of a fixed interest rate. This 
author also accounts for structural breaks in the process, by splitting the sample in dif­
ferent periods and thus reverting Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) results. Subsequently, 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) relax the assumption that expenditures and revenues are 
difference-stationary, but maintain a constant expected real rate of the interest. These 
authors test for cointegration based on the behaviour of the interest-inclusive deficit. 
They then assess under which conditions cointegration holds when interest rates are 
allowed to be stochastic. Trehan and Walsh (1991) demonstrate tha t if the expected 
real rate of interest is more than zero, and the inclusive-of-interest deficit is stationary, 
then the intertemporal budget balance is held.
More recently, Davig (2005) tests the present-value constraint using a Markov 
Switching approach, using an updated data  series on US discounted debt. This method 
has several advantages, as it separates local unsustainability from global sustainability 
of the debt process. Thus, if periods of expanding debt do not last for long, the debt 
process will remain sustainable, tha t is, the unconditional mean of the Markov-switching
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stochastic process underlying discounted debt is zero.
The next section discusses definitions and the construction of a discounted debt 
series.
6.3.2 Discounted Debt data for Thailand 
We restate the fundamental government budget constraint (already discussed in chapter
4)
Dt = { l T i ) D t - i - P S t  (6.1)
Dt : government debt in the present period
D t-i : government debt in the previous period
P St : the difference of government expenditures and revenues
i : the interest rate for the debt
Assuming that seigniorage is negligible,
Iterating equation (6.2) n  periods forward yields the government intertemporal budget 
constraint;
O O
Dt =  T h+k) ^{Rt+n — Gt+n) +  lini IIfcr=i(l +  it+k) ^Dt+n (6.3)
n=0
This equation demonstrates tha t Dt, the present value of government debt is the com­
bination of the expected present value of the future primary surpluses +
it+k)~^{Rt+n — Gt+n) and limn_oonfc=i(l +  Zt+fc)“ ^A+n the expected present value of 
the government’s debt in a limiting term.
The term lim„_^oon/c=i(l +  it+k)~^Dt+n can be interpreted as a solvency condition, 
so th a t in the future, the present value government’s debt converges to zero.
Next, we construct a series for discounted debt using time-varying interest rates, 
following Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Wilcox (1989)^. Indebtedness should be
 ^Hamilton and Flavin(1986) test this constraint assuming a constant real interest rate, while Wilcox 
(1989) allows the interest rate to vary.
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defined as net of holding of gold, so th a t the relevant interest rate is defined as the 
holding-period return on the stock of government debt net of the real value of gold. 
This adjustment takes into account the well documented evidence th a t governments 
often run down their stocks of gold in the wake of fiscal crises.
Another im portant point to consider when testing sustainability in developing coun­
tries through the present-value constraint is the role of seigniorage, as it can be used as 
a source for financing fiscal deficits. Thus, in order to account for money creation, gov­
ernment surplus should be defined for the consolidated public sector (i.e., government 
and central bank) and therefore the relevant expression should be
St — Rt ~  Gt 'ïï'tMt, (fi-4)
where tt^ denotes the inflation rate and M* represents real monetary base. In the case 
of Thailand, seigniorage does not appear to represent a significant source of deficit fi­
nancing, as it is relatively stationary and does not seem have increased during the more 
turbulent periods after 1997, as can be seen in Figure 6.2.
Thailand public debt’s data has been extracted from the IMF database, in annual 
terms. The data consists of domestic and foreign debts, as well as the domestic (lend­
ing) interest rate, US treasury bill rates (used as the foreign interest rate), world gold 
prices, the Consumer Price Index and the Primary Surplus. The sample period of the 
data is 1975 to 2003.
In order to obtain the discounted debt series, the following steps have been taken:
1. calculate the rate of return of gold by forming the ratio of the world gold price 
and the CPI,
2. yield the real rate return of gold by subtracting from the foreign interest rate by 
the rate of return of gold from the previous step,
3. the discount factor can be obtained by beginning with the accumulation of gov­
ernment debt, following Wilcox (1989) and Davig (2005)’s works;
dt =  (1 +  rt)dt-i — pst (6.5)
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Fig. 6.2: The Seigniorage of Thailand
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where dt is the government, rt is the real interest rate in the previous period and 
pst is the primary surplus.
Let kt be the real discount variable from period t  back to the starting period; 
hence we obtain;
t=i
A:* =  I J ( 1 +  rf)“ ;^/co =  1 (6.6)
j^O
4. From the above equation, discounted debt and the discount factor for primary 
surplus are normalized by multiplying the equation (6.1) through by kf,
ktdt == h - \d t - i  -  ktpst (6.7)
Rewriting the above equation with DDt is discounted debt and PSt is discounted 
primary surplus, we therefore obtain;
(6.8)
5. The total discounted value of the debt is computed by summarizing both domestic 
and foreign discounted debts.
Figure 6.3 displays the series obtained for Thailand. As can be observed, the series 
displays a relatively smooth path until 1997, with a subsequent steep increase, coincid­
ing with the Asian crisis. As discussed in previous chapters, sudden jumps or regime 
changes can affect inference on the sustainability of the debt process. Next, we study 
stationarity and test for potential breaks in the discounted debt series.
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Fig. 6.3: Thailand Discounted Debt
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6.4 Preliminary Statistical Analysis
The standard test for sustainability is to test for unit roots in the debt process. As 
shown in figure 6.1, the series remains fairly stable for the first part of the sample, but 
displays a significant positive trend after 1997/1998. From a theoretical point of view, 
a test of a unit root in the debt series should not contain a trend, but one could argue 
that, from a purely statistical perspective, a trend should be included. Given this, we 
present results both for the case of no trend and with a trend included.
Table 6.2 displays the results of unit root and stationarity tests (automated lag 
length selection criteria are used for all tests). It is possible to observe tha t the evidence 
is overwhelmingly in favour of a unit root being present in the series. Hence, one would 
conclude tha t debt is not sustainable.
However, visual inspection and prior knowledge lead us to believe tha t a break may have 
occurred around the period of the Asian crisis. One possibility is to use the Chow test 
at an exogenously chosen break date, but this test may have its performance affected 
if the date is mistakenly chosen. Instead, we prefer the break point to be endogenously 
determined by the data. Thus, we resort to the tests for unknown breakpoints developed 
by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1996), based on a seminal paper by 
Quandt (1960). The idea is to test for a break at every possible sample point (using 
a Chow test Ft , for example) and then analyse a function of this sequence of tests. A 
natural choice is to analyse the largest value in this sequence
Q ~ su p F r(A ) , (6.9)AeJ
where F t  (A) represents the Chow statistic computed over a support J  — (Aq, Ai) c  
(0,1) indicating the fraction of the sample corresponding to a particular observation. 
Uniformly most powerful alternatives have been suggested by Andrews and Ploberger 
(1994), which entail averaging the sequence
1 ^m ean-F T{\) =  ^  Ft(A) (6.10)
or, alternatively, an exponential ‘mean’ 
E xp -Ft {X) — log
1 +  Ai -  Ao
1 +  Ai -  Ao (6.11)
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Unit root tests I-level first different
Augmented Ddickey Fuller -3.4908* -4.7206***
(0.0623) (0.0070)
Dickey-Fuller GLS (ERS) -3.7501** -4.6553***
(0.0010) (0.0001)
Phillips-Perron -3.1128 -5.5004***
(0.0021) (0.0009)
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock Point-Optimal 8.5236 5620.745
Ng-Perron - MZa -12.0847 -12.2657
Ng-Perron - MZt -2.1812 -2.1348
Ng-Perron - MSB 0.1806* 0.1741*
Ng-Perron - MPT 8.9017 9.0965
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 0.1303* 0.2545
*** statistically significant at 1% level 
** statistically significant at 5% level 
* statistically significant at 10% level
Tab. 6.2: Unit root Test for Thailand’s Discounted Debt
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Andrews (1993) shows tha t the Chow test can have any of the classical forms (LR, 
LM or Wald). However, these tests require the support to be ‘trimmed’, since they are 
not defined for the entire sample. The recommended default is to use J  =  (Aq,Ai) =  
(0.15,0.85), tha t is, one excludes the first and the last 15% of observations.
Sup F-statistic (1998) Exp F-statistic Ave F-statistic
LR and Wald Tests 17.59176
(0.0035)
6.019436
(0.0032)
3.462131
(0.1229)
Hq: no breakpoints within trimmed data.
Tab. 6.3: Stability Test for Discounted Debt time series
Table 6.3 presents the results of the tests applied to an AR(1) process fitted to 
the discounted debt series^. The null hypothesis of constant coefficients is comfortably 
rejected by the sup F t  and Exp-Ft  versions, with extremely low p-values (calculated 
using Hansen’s (1997) procedure), and is close to being rejected at the 10% significance 
level by the mean-FT statistic. As expected, the break date picked up by the sup F t  
test is 1998, which coincides with the full effect of the Asian crisis.
Thus, given tha t the series displays a structural break, this fact has to be taken into 
account when assessing global sustainability of the debt process. A useful solution is to 
model debt as a Markov switching series, following Davig (2005). This is done in the 
next section.
 ^Additional lagged terras were not significant.
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6.5 Discounted Debt Using a Markov-Switching Approach
This section tests the present-value constraint by employing a Markov Switching ap­
proach. We admit the possibility of alternating states where discounted debt is col­
lapsing and expanding. Global sustainability results if the unconditional mean of the 
process is zero. Indeed, even if the process is at an expansionary stage, a fiscal pol­
icy can still be sustainable. This can be determined by testing the persistence of the 
regimes.
We model discounted debt as a two-state^ Markov Switching process:
=  7(sf)-P pDf-i -h  £f (6.12)
where {st} is a stationary random sequence with mean zero and unit variance, while 
St is a discrete-valued independent latent process, uncorrelated with £t-i for all i. This 
variable indicate the unobserved regime operative at time t for Dt, forming a homo­
geneous first-order Markov chain with state space {1,2} and transition probabilities 
Pii =  Pr(st — l|5t_i =  1), P22 = Pr(st =  2|st_i — 2)with a transition matrix
P n  Pi2
P21 P22
Table 6.4 presents maximum likelihood estimates of equation 6.16 obtained with a 
numerical optimization procedure using the BFGS algorithm, along with correspond­
ing asymptotic standard errors. Regime 1 is represented by 7 (1), indicating a low 
level of debt, whereas 7 (2) corresponds to the expanding regime. Note, however, that 
the estimated value of the unconditional mean is not significantly different from zero. 
This corresponds to the pre-crisis period and conditional on staying in this regime, the 
present-value constraint is satisfied. The value of 7 (2), on the other hand, is signifi­
cantly different from zero, implying tha t the present-value constraint is violated in this 
regime, so tha t fiscal policy is locally unsustainable. Conditional upon staying in this 
regime, discounted debt would become explosive.
 ^Given the sample size, the possibility of more than two regimes was not tested.
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Figure 6.4 plots the corresponding smoothed probabilities for regime 2. As expected,
7 (1) 7 (2) P Pu P22 InL
MS - AR (1) 23971.624
(24439.88)
264962.26**
(68486.83)
0.891
(0.089)
0.9668
(0.1607)
0.9271
(0.5873)
324.5942
Tab. 6.4: Discounted Debt via Markov Switching Approach
the switching appears to occur in 1998, coinciding with the currency crisis period. In 
order to assess whether the switch from regime 1 to regime 2 implies long run fiscal un­
sustainability, one needs to test global stationarity of the process. Theorem 1 in Davig 
(2005) contains an expression of the present-value constraints in a Markov switching 
framework and can be summarized as follows:
• If p <  1, then the uncondtional mean of Dt converges to zero if
A(/2 -  p H ) -T  =  0
where F =  [7 (1) 7 (2 ))', A =  [A(l) A(2)j and A(2) =  Pr(s( — i), i  =  1, 2 , while I 2 
indicates a 2 x 2 identity m atrix (see Davig, p. 838).
The 1 x 2  vector A(/2 — p n )“ ^F gives the weights placed on 7 (1) and 7 (2) for the test 
on whether the process converges to zero. Testing this condition determines whether 
the unconditional mean of discounted debt is zero. The procedure implies setting A(l) 
and A (2) equal to the ergo die probabilities
1 ~ P j jA(%)
for z =  1,2 and j  =  1, 2.
This nonlinear restriction is tested with a likelihood ratio test, tha t is, by comparing 
the likelihoods of the restricted and unrestricted models. The test is asymptotically 
X^(l). The constrained likelihood is —324.5942, so tha t the likelihood ratio yields 
2(324.5942—319.5450) =  10.0983, so th a t the null is rejected at the standard significance 
levels. This implies th a t the unconditional mean of the process is significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, we find tha t the present-value constraint on Thailand’s discounted 
debt is not satisfied, implying a globally unsustainable fiscal policy.
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Fig. 6.4: The Discounted Debt of Thailand via a Markov Switching approach
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6.6 Conclusion
This chapter applies the methodology proposed by Davig (2005) to test sustainability 
of fiscal policy. Based on a Markov switching framework, it tests whether or not the 
discounted debt is globally unsustainable, accounting for the possibility of changes in 
regime, where fiscal policy may oscillate between calm and explosive periods. We show 
tha t a significant shift in policy occurred around the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, 
which is confirmed by tests of structural breaks and Markov switching transition proba­
bilities. A test for global sustainability of Thailand’s discounted debt reveals tha t fiscal 
policy appears to be unsustainable.
This finding does not seem to be in accordance with the results stemming from 
the analysis of the previous chapters. One possible explanation, which is a potential 
methodological lesson, is that by focusing on the univariate dynamics of the discounted 
debt process, one is missing the added efficiency tha t a multivariate approach could 
bring. Thus, a future topic for research would be to carry out a multivariate Markov 
switching analysis of the joint dynamics of government revenues and expenditures, to­
gether with discounted debt.
Naturally, the result of this chapter is highly influenced by the for the sample period 
considered here. Given tha t data  on official debt is subject to considerable revisions, it 
was not possible to include data  on more recent years. If, as preliminary reports suggest, 
debt has declined recently, it may well be the case tha t results on an extended dataset 
would revert our conclusions. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study is to illustrate 
the usefulness of the approach devised by Davig (2005), which has clear methodological 
advantages. By considering the possibility of different regimes, it allows for a more 
accurate statistical description and inference on fiscal sustainability. On the other 
hand, this approach can be used as a tool to signal sustainability issues. As new data 
become available, the debtor’s position can be re-evaluated, even if sudden changes in 
policy occur.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this thesis, as mentioned in the introduction, was twofold. On one 
hand, we attem pted to make use of distinct methods from which inferences regarding 
sustainability of the fiscal stance could be drawn. On the other hand, we looked for 
potential explanations for the fact tha t several studies point to widespread fiscal un­
sustainability, when in reality default episodes are uncommon.
We first applied a simple approach, th a t of the Indicator of Fiscal Sustainability. We 
have seen tha t its main advantage is simplicity, both of calculation and interpretation. 
Its purpose, however, is to summarize the information stemming from the variables of 
interest, rather than testing empirical implications of theoretical models of fiscal sus­
tainability. Albeit it lacks the formal rigor of statistical methods, it can be very helpful 
in identifying periods of unsustainability.
We then concentrated on the main theoretical framework to understand debt dy­
namics, the Intertemporal Budget Constraint. From this condition, we are able to 
define a typology of distinct cases and derive testable implications. We have seen that 
the appropriate statistical framework in which to conduct empirical analysis is cointe­
gration. We also noted tha t an efficient test of ‘strong’ sustainability has so far been 
ignored in the literature. Thus, we illustrated the implementation of such a test, based 
on the procedures derived by Horvath and Watson (1995) for cointegration analysis 
when the cointegration vector is pre-specified. Once such a method is put in practice, 
contradictions between results from standard procedures and conventional wisdom and 
stylized facts seem to vanish.
However, we also point to a potential caveat with cointegration analysis of fiscal 
sustainability. Given that it deals with long run, it is likely that typical samples will
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contain periods in which substantial and persistent deviations from a sustainable path 
may have taken place. We show, by means of cointegration tests robust to structural 
breaks tha t appears to be the case with the countries under scrutiny. To tackle this, 
we suggest the application of two approaches. In chapter 5, we propose using a Markov 
switching cointegration approach, which allow us to test for cointegration and model 
debt dynamics when the relationship may be subject to regime changes. This is novel in 
this literature. Using this method, we show th a t the results strongly favour the sustain­
ability hypothesis. It also allow us to identify the periods in which governments have 
faced difficulties and may have switched to a non-sustainable or a weakly sustainable 
path.
A second approach is to directly model the dynamics of discounted debt, based once 
again on a testable implication of the Intertemporal Budget Constraint. As mentioned 
above, the purpose is model instances in which fiscal policy is subject to abrupt changes, 
motivated by political or economic reasons. This may lead to periods of sustained rise 
in the value of discounted debt and may have im portant implications for the statistical 
analysis of debt dynamics, as it can result in apparent global unsustainability. We 
followed Davig (2005) in resorting to a Markov switching sustainability test, applied 
to Thailand’s discounted debt. We found long periods corresponding to debt sustain­
ability, alternating with shorter periods of rapidly expanding debt which are locally 
unsustainable. We apply Davig’s (2005) test for a null restriction on the unconditional 
mean of the process is zero and found th a t evidence of unsustainability for Thailand.
Interestingly, we can observe that there is an overall agreement between the more 
informal approach offered by the IFS and the Markov switching models tha t account 
for occasional departures of sustainability. Indeed, the IFS is able to identify periods 
of unsustainability, but these in general are short-lived and do not tend to last. This 
is the broad conclusion that we can retain from the application of Markov switching 
models. Indeed, we found that once these episodes are accounted for, evidence favours 
the case for global fiscal sustainability.
Overall, we believe the main goals of this dissertation were achieved, that is, to 
provide an illustration of the usefulness of several methodologies to assess fiscal sus-
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tainability. Some of these approaches were applied in this work for the first time in 
the context of fiscal sustainability studies. Nevertheless, this work suffers from several 
limitations and insufficiencies. T ime constraints did not allow the pursuit of a more 
thorough analysis of both the joint and the univariate dynamics of the variables of 
interest, through richer specifications in the context of Markov switching models. An 
interesting possibility would be to model the apparent surge in volatility tha t accom­
panies periods of fiscal difficulties. For tha t purpose, one could model the variance as 
following a distinct independent Markov chain. Another interesting perspective would 
be to model the transition probabilities to be dependent on explanatory variables and, 
thus, time-varying. A natural extension would then be to evaluate how good these 
richer non-linear models are in terms of predicting crises.
Nevertheless, we find th a t the results presented here can provide useful guidelines for 
future work. One example is the development of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib­
rium (DSGE) models, which have been successfully used to model and assess monetary 
policy. The next generation of DSGE will seek to model the fiscal side of the economy 
and therefore will have to take into account the particularities of debt dynamics. We 
hope we have contributed, though in a very limited fashion, to bring new results to the 
fore and hence provide clues for the next challenges in this topic.
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